The housing sector is a reliable leading indicator in most economies. It leads at the peak of the cycle by 12–18 months, at the trough by 6–12. A whole string of housing indicators are slumping, including prices. This chart, from Trading Economics, shows the sales of existing houses (i.e. not new ones) and as now as almost as low as it has been in 25 years. It may be close to bottoming, because the 30 year bond yield, off which fixed rate mortgages are priced, has prolly passed its cyclical peak. But that still postpones any recovery to the second half, maybe even Q4 this year.
Showing posts with label housing bubble. Show all posts
Showing posts with label housing bubble. Show all posts
Saturday, January 21, 2023
Tuesday, December 20, 2022
Oz PMI falls in December
It's provisional data based on 80-90% of the sample population, but the trend is obvious. Since it takes many months for the economy to respond to rising interest rates, the decline is likely to continue. A recovery in China might help mitigate the Australian recession, but with Covid deaths and illness soaring there, it's hard to be sure just how strong the probable upturn in China is likely to be. And offsetting that there's the fact that house prices in Australia rose sharply as interest rates were cut to zero during the Covid Crash and have a long way to fall to get back to "normal". A house price crash here in Australia seems all too likely.
Labels:
Australia,
Covid Crash,
house prices,
housing bubble,
PMI
Saturday, December 29, 2018
US pending home sales plummet
US pending home sales fell 7.7% in November year on year.
The evidence of an impending US recession continues to build.
The evidence of an impending US recession continues to build.
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| Source: Trading Economics |
Monday, August 20, 2018
Coastal property bubble
If you want to have a seaside property, you want it to be as close as possible to the water, right? Only problem is, unless you build on top of a cliff, you are vulnerable to rising sea levels. Not just "nuisance flooding" but storm surges and erosion. And this is starting to affect property values.
From ThinkProgress:
Home buyers are starting to incorporate climate risk into the price of property in areas facing warming-driven extreme weather disasters, new research finds. And that’s bad news for the trillion-dollar coastal property bubble.
“Homes in areas most exposed to flood and hurricane risk were worth less last year, on average, than a decade earlier,” according to analysis released Monday by Bloomberg News. Also, the price of homes at lowest risk for wildfires “far outpaced those with the greatest risk.”
The analysis by property data firm Attom Data Solutions, looked at home prices in some 3,400 U.S. cities. The firm examined five risk groups ranging from “very low” to “very high” for various extreme climate events.
Their analysis of home prices versus flood risk reveals that from 2007 to 2017, homes at “high” or “very high” risk of extreme flooding saw a 4.8 to 5.6 percent drop in price, while homes at the lowest risk saw an 8.4 to 9.6 percent rise.
[Read more here]
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
Treasury sell off
It's tempting to believe that if bonds are selling off, so should equities. But it depends why they are being sold. If, for example, they're being sold because the government is in strife, currency is fleeing the country, etc, then both markets should sell off together. But if they are selling off because bond yields (remember, a rise in yield = a fall in price; the chart on the left shows the yield on 10 year US Treasury bonds) are reverting to "normal" because the risk of recession has diminished, then bonds may sell off while equities advance.
The ending of QE (quantitative easing) exacerbates this dynamic. QE was introduced to prevent depression, which duly happened, and now that the economy is once again on a path of sustained growth, QE is no longer needed. Since QE involved the Fed buying long-dated bonds, the phased withdrawal ("tapering") of this massive buyer has inevitably led to a bond sell off.
There is a risk for shares, and that is that the rise fixed rate mortgages as a response to the rise bond yields will cause the economy to slow, since housing is such a significant swing factor. One to watch, for us and the Fed.
Labels:
bonds,
eco recovery,
housing bubble,
share market,
The Fed
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Spot the housing bubble
This article has a really useful interactive chart showing housing affordability in several countries.
Frankly, houses look horribly expensive in Oz, and dirt cheap in the US (remember that the currency is irrelevant here)
At Th Age's website, you can select which countries to show, and compare them with your own. Nice work!
Frankly, houses look horribly expensive in Oz, and dirt cheap in the US (remember that the currency is irrelevant here)
At Th Age's website, you can select which countries to show, and compare them with your own. Nice work!
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Escaping liquidity traps
A "liquidity trap" is where interest rates are zero, and so cannot be reduced any further, even if that is necessary to stimulate growth. In most developed countries, the cash (discount) rate is at or very close to zero. Stimulating growth requires further monetary stimulus, and the current technique is called QE (quantitative easing) where the central bank buys long-dated government stock to drive down long term interest rates. But that hasn't been very effective.
The last time we had a liquidity trap on the scale we now do was during the great depression. In this article, Nicholas Crafts shows how the government stimulated the British economy using unconventional measures.
In mid-1932, the UK had experienced a recession of a similar magnitude to that of 2008-09, was engaged in fiscal consolidation that reduced the structural budget deficit by about 4% of GDP, had short-term interest rates that were close to zero, and was in a double-dip recession (Crafts and Fearon 2013). The years from 1933 through 1936 saw a very strong recovery with growth of over 4% in every year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain (in office from November 1931 to May 1937) was the architect of this recovery.
The last time we had a liquidity trap on the scale we now do was during the great depression. In this article, Nicholas Crafts shows how the government stimulated the British economy using unconventional measures.
In mid-1932, the UK had experienced a recession of a similar magnitude to that of 2008-09, was engaged in fiscal consolidation that reduced the structural budget deficit by about 4% of GDP, had short-term interest rates that were close to zero, and was in a double-dip recession (Crafts and Fearon 2013). The years from 1933 through 1936 saw a very strong recovery with growth of over 4% in every year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain (in office from November 1931 to May 1937) was the architect of this recovery.
The policy framework adopted from mid-1932 has a strong resemblance to the so-called ‘foolproof way’ of escaping from the liquidity trap (Svensson, 2003) and to ‘Abenomics’ in today’s Japan:
- After the forced exit from the gold standard in September 1931, by the middle of 1932 the Treasury had devised the so-called ‘cheap-money policy’.
Initially, short-term interest rates were cut to around 0.6% – and stayed there throughout the rest of the decade (see Table 1).
- Second, a price-level target was announced by Chamberlain in July 1932 which aimed to end price deflation and return prices to the 1929 level.
- Third, the Treasury adopted a policy of exchange-rate targets that entailed a large devaluation first pegging the pound against the dollar at 3.40 and then against the French franc at 77 (Howson 1980), intervening in the market through the Exchange Equalisation Account set up in the summer of 1932 (see Table 2).
Real interest rates fell quite dramatically and very quickly and gold reserves almost doubled within a year. By the end of 1936, the money supply had grown by 34% compared with early 1932 (Howson 1975).
The cheap-money policy followed the textbook approach for operating at the zero lower bound of seeking to reduce the real interest rate by raising inflationary expectations. A key aspect was that the Treasury under Chamberlain, rather than the Bank of England under Montagu Norman, ran monetary policy after the exit from the gold standard. The classic problem with the ‘foolproof way’, especially for central banks, is whether they can credibly commit to maintaining inflation once recovery appears to be under way. Because of its problems with fiscal sustainability, the Treasury was in a good position to persuade markets that it wanted sustained moderate inflation as part of a strategy to reduce the real interest rate below the growth rate of real GDP and to benefit from this differential in reducing the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. This reliance, based on ‘financial repression’, allowed more tolerance for lower primary budget surpluses and eased worries about ‘self-defeating austerity’ without a Keynesian approach to the public finances.
Obviously, for the cheap-money policy to work it needed to stimulate demand – a transmission mechanism into the real economy was needed. One specific aspect of this is worth exploring, namely, the impact that cheap money had on house-building. The number of houses built by the private sector rose from 133,000 in 1931/2 to 293,000 in 1934/5 and 279,000 in 1935/6 – many of these dwellings being the famous 1930s semi-detached houses which proliferated around London and more generally across southern England. The construction of these houses directly contributed an additional £55 million to economic activity by 1934 and multiplier effects from increased employment probably raised the total impact to £80 million or about a third of the increase in GDP between 1932 and 1934. House building reacted to the reduction in interest rates and also to the recognition by developers that construction costs had bottomed out; both of these stimuli resulted from the cheap-money policy (Howson 1975).
Read the rest of the article here.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
The Lucky Country
Take a look at the relative growth rates of Australia, New Zealand, the US, UK and Europe in the chart. Starting in Q1/2004 at 100, Australia is nearly at 155 (and that was before today's scorching 1.2 % Q-on-Q growth estimate for Q2/2010) much higher than any of the other countries or regions shown. Why?
Partly luck. China continues to boom, and we're selling them raw materials. China is now the world's largest consumer of commodities. And despite a Chinese "slowdown" (we should be so lucky), prices and volumes just keep going up.
Partly good management. Unlike the Fed, the RBA took away the liquor before the party got too wild. They started raising interest rates early on before the 2002-2007 boom got out of hand, whereas the Fed kept rates too low allowing an unsustainable housing bubble to swell. When it duly burst everybody was covered with gunk.
Partly immigration. Massive immigration, some of it allegedly temporary (students here to study in a cheap but definitely not nasty English-speaking country) helped push up demand for housing, demand for everything. Our unemployment rate is just 5%.
There's talk of an Ozzie housing bubble. Meself, I doubt it. Unless... they slash immigration and remove negative gearing.
BTW, did you observe the good performance of New Zealand in all this? And they don't produce any commodities. Beaut country though. Maybe it's all the tourism.
Labels:
GDP,
growth,
housing bubble,
immigration,
the lucky country
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