WWEA half-year wind report

From the World Wind Energy Association (WWEA)

Wind power deployment worldwide slowed down substantially in the first half of the year 2026, with new installations reaching 59 GW, substantially less than the 71 GW of 2025. On an annual basis, over the twelve months from July 2025 to June 2026, new installations reached 159 GW, compared to 152 GW in the previous period. This reflects the still strong momentum of the wind industry worldwide.

Accordingly, due to various factors and based on expectations of our members, it is expected that wind power deployment will again accelerate in the second half of 2026 so that total installations will reach a level similar to that of 2025, 173 GW.

The current global wind capacity has reached 1407 GW and is expected to reach 1521 GW by end of this year. In the year 2030, an overall capacity of at least 2250 GW is expected.

The global growth rate in the first half of 2026 was 4,37%, after 6,06% a year ago. On an annual basis, the growth rate was at 12,76%, less than the 13,88% of the previous year. Throughout the whole year 2026, a growth rate of 12,84% is expected, less than 14,59% of the year 2025.

Highlights

⭕ 58,9 GW added in the first half of 2026, down 18% year-on-year [after a very strong 2025]
⭕159 GW installed between July 2025 and June 2026
⭕Global total: 1’407 GW (1,407 TW) as of June 2026
⭕Annual growth rate: 12,76%
⭕Wind power share: ~12% of global electricity supply
⭕China: 38,7 GW added, 25% less than in the previous year
⭕US and Germany show strong momentum, Brazil, France and UK slump
⭕ Full-year 2026 outlook: around 173 GW new installations expected
⭕Projected total by the end of 2026: over 1’521 GW
⭕Projected total by the end of 2030: more than 2’250 GW

The semiannual growth rate reached 4,4%, compared with 6,1% in the first half of 2025, 4,0% in 2024 and 4,2% in 2023. This growth rate is typically lower than the expected growth rate for the second half of the year, when more than 8% growth is again expected. Throughout the whole year 2026, the growth of 12,8% is expected, after 14,6% in 2025.

 

After a very strong year 2025, the year 2026 started with lower momentum, however robust growth. It is expected that growth will again become stronger in the second half of the year, as the wind industry can use its existing capacities.

Growing uncertainties in some countries may rather result in more installations this year, as investors rush to benefit from existing frameworks. This may, however, have a slightly negative medium-term impact.

For various reasons, the global wind markets are expected to regain momentum in the second half of 2026 and accelerated expansion is expected.
According to WWEA member estimates, total new installations for the full year are likely to reach over 173 GW – slightly more than in 2025.
This exceeds the 123 GW added in 2024, 123 GW in 2023, and 85 GW in 2022.

By the end of 2026, global cumulative wind capacity is projected to exceed 1’521 GW, sufficient to generate around 12% of the world’s electricity.

Wind has slowed down as solar and batteries got much cheaper than wind.  But wind is still needed in higher latitudes because of the winter decline in solar.  However, its growth is still higher than the growth of global electricity demand, so its share will keep on rising.

Half of China's new heavy trucks are electric

 From John Hanger

Good morning with good news: China's EV heavy truck sales surge from 13.9% in 2024 to 50.3% in September 2026! EV truck sales jump 64% in first 9 months of 2026, compared to 2025. EV were 38.3% of truck sales, so far in 2026! China's 2030 goal is 40%. electrek.co/2026/11/02/e... #energysky

A reply from James Chance 

Chinese trucks alone accounted for 3.7 mbd of diesel consumption acc to a US EIA 2024 estimate. Displacement by e-trucks of 0.23 mbd this year and clearly heading rapidly south thereafter. Hopefully the rest of the world can also follow this trend ASAP.

Commentators keep on asserting that it would be difficult to electrify heavy trucks.  China proves this wrong.

US paying biggest price for oil shock

 From This is Not Cool

Graph: Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air

[...] Meanwhile, a new study from a Finnish think tank adds that Americans have paid more in additional costs than any other country.

Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (Finland):

This is because of America’s exceptional oil consumption due to high reliance on inefficient, oil-burning private vehicles and a slow transition away from petrol and diesel – leaving households, truckers and farmers particularly exposed to global fuel market shocks.

Fuel prices have risen for two reasons: increased price of crude oil, and a shortage of refining capacity. Refining capacity has shrunk as the disruptions to Hormuz traffic and Iran’s strikes on refineries have shut Gulf refining capacity off the market, and Ukraine’s counterattacks on Russia have affected refining capacity in the country.

According to the Finnish data, “The reason that per capita costs in the US are so high is the high consumption of fuels per person and lack of progress in reducing reliance on oil.”

So, when Trump promised the Oil industry that if they supported his election bid, he would open the bag for them, they responded with massive support, and got in return massive influence, even compared to other oil-friendly Republican administrations.

Support for EV sales was axed, even though the cost to the US Auto industry, heavily invested in an EV transition, was immense. Consumers were left with no affordable off-ramp from oil dependence.

Then, the trap was sprung.

And despite those high prices, US oil companies are not rushing to drill new wells. Why would they? The Trump administration keeps promising that the high prices are about to drop in response to some as yet unidentified policy change or solution to the war.

Wall Street Journal:

Despite their windfall of cash, Exxon and Chevron signaled they plan to remain conservative in their spending, cutting debt and strengthening their balance sheets.

Exxon has slashed its net debt by almost $11 billion this year; Chevron by $13.8 billion. Even as prices climbed, Chevron spent less than last year in the Permian Basin of West Texas and New Mexico, the epicenter of its American oil production, where output was flat at roughly 1 million barrels a day.

Scientific American:

Long-term, expect no great surge in new U.S. drilling. “Oil companies don’t usually respond to economic conditions brought on by policies that can be temporary,” says Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy, an app that tracks gas prices for drivers. It takes six months or more to get full production from a new well, Cowan says, so producers making these decisions must think about what the fuel will cost months down the line. Funny how, regardless of the particular circumstance, Republican administrations again and again see war in the oil rich Middle East as a solution to every problem. I’m sure the windfall profits are just an oddly repetitive coincidence.

Republicans enabled an autocrat

 by Ann Telnaes

New Yorker cover, Oct 2022

 

Strong PMIs & interest rates

The GDP-weighted average PMI for the big-8 economies (US, UK, Euro Zone, Japan, China, Brazil, Russia, India) is rising strongly.  When the Iran War began, all the country commentary by S&P Global emphasised the stock (inventory) building by manufacturers responding to the imminent rise in prices caused by the war.  At the time, I thought this would only last a month, and it would then peter out.  I was wrong.  Raised inventories led to increased orders, which led into turn to increased production and still further increases in targeted inventory levels — a classic inventory cycle.   The surge has lasted a lot longer than one or two months.

The commentary now, at country level, is invariably about rising input, and sometimes, also selling prices.

For Central Bankers, looking for clues about prospective inflation, these are red flags.  Add to that the strong jump in PMIs, and you can see why CBs have been raising interest rates (see lower chart).  

My fear is that this is precisely at the wrong time, because the AI bubble is bursting, and that will bring down growth in the US and other countries.  If we add rising interest rates to this mix, we risk a deep and sharp recession.  Am I certain the AI bubble is bursting?  Yes.  Do I believe CBs will raise interest rates again?  Not so certain, but I think the risk is high.  It depends on how sharply (if) stock markets fall and private credit flows dry up.  

The US election makes a sort of peace with Iran more likely, and oil prices have prolly peaked, which is good news for economies and (eventually) inflation.  However, CBs have a tendency to wait too long and then to overdo it when they finally move.  A period of risks for economies and markets lies ahead.

[Reminder:  This is not financial advice. Discuss any major investment decisions with your financial planner first.]

Net-zero or real-zero

A statement by Fortescue Mining's Chief Climate Scientist
From Climate Integrity

The net-zero by 2050 target that many countries have adopted sounds wonderful, until you dig into it.  The goal of net-zero is to balance emissions with net withdrawals of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, in other words to stop atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases (Co2, methane, NOx) from rising.  That's logical, isn't it?  

Only, it hasn't worked out this way.  Polluters have bought "offsets" to "reduce" their net emissions.  But what are these "offsets"?   A village in a poor country promises not to cut down a forest, and the net emissions "saved" by this are bought by an industrial company, which can then claim its own net emissions have "fallen".   Only, when we investigate, we find that the villagers have in fact cleared the forest.  Or an Ozzie farmer promises not to clear some land, which he was not going to clear anyway, and that counts as an "offset".  Or trees will be planted on previously cleared land, and since trees absorb carbon dioxide, this can be monetised as an "offset".  Never mind that at the next bushfire, all the carbon embedded in the trees will be released back into the atmosphere.  

Meanwhile, actual emissions haven't fallen.

When the idea of net-zero was bruited, polluters fell upon it with cries of glee.  They could keep their existing operations unchanged, but still gain kudos by claiming how green they were.  An Ozzie oil company claimed its petrol and diesel were "green" because it bought "offsets" equal to the CO2 that would be produced when the petrol was burned.  An Australian electricity utility claimed its electricity was "zero-carbon" because it bought "offsets".

You get the picture.

The problem is that real withdrawal of CO2 from the atmosphere is expensive — unless you capture the CO2 directly from the flues of coal- or gas-fired power stations, and bury it deep underground, and even that adds  +-$90/MWh to the cost of the electricity produced.  (That's a 2018 costing; it's certainly much higher now.)  If the carbon dioxide produced really is stored in deep caverns, and doesn't leak back into the atmosphere, then this will genuinely reduce atmospheric carbon emissions, and so qualifies as a genuine carbon offset.   And yet, for the cost of adding CCS (carbon capture and storage) to coal/gas power stations, you could have a battery-solar farm at a lower cost per MWh, which can provide carbon-free baseload power. 

Hence the increased interest in real-zero.  Zero actual emissions, not some accounting fudge with pretend reduced emissions.  What a novel idea!

So let's suppose we target real-zero by 2050.  How fast would emissions have to fall each year to get there?  Well, emissions would have to fall by 12% a year, compound.  I don't want to shatter your hopes, but that is not going to happen.  It's true that China's emissions have prolly peaked.  But as for an imminent steep decline?  India's emissions are still rising, even though renewables provided all of the increase in electricity demand last year thanks to a cooler than normal summer.

+-30% of emissions comes from electricity generation, and +-15% from land transport.  If we could stop emissions from these two sectors by 2050, that would translate into a compound annual decline of 2.5%.   This should be easy to achieve.   EVs are heading rapidly towards 100% of car, light and heavy truck and bus sales.   By 2050, the existing ICEV fleets will have been transitioned to EVs.   By 2050, most of the world's electricity grids will be nearing 100% renewables, as wind, solar and battery costs continue to fall.

But a 45% cut in emissions by 2050 is not enough.  The rise in global temperatures is proportional to the level of emissions.  Halving emissions will halve the temperature increase, but recently the rise in temperature has accelerated, from 0.2 C to 0.3C per decade.   We want to cut the decadal rise to 0.1 degrees C, or less, to give us more time to transition to a zero-carbon economy.

Suppose, instead of 2.5% per annum, we were to target 5% per annum?  That would cut emissions by 70% by 2050, reducing the decadal temperature rise to 0.1 C.  In addition to electricity generation and transport, we would need to cut emissions in industry (iron, steel, chemicals, cement), and replace oil and gas heating with heat pumps. 

Even if net-zero was a sensible target, it's 24 years away.  How many of the politicians earnestly assuring us that they really, really mean to reach this fabled land will still be around to explain their failure by then?  We need an annual target.  And I submit that the annual target should be 5%.  2.5% per annum will be easy.  5% will require an effort.  But it will also mean we could limit the increase in global temperatures to 2 degrees C by 2050.

These would be the long-term 2050 targets:

✔️ 100% of electricity from renewables;

✔️ 100% of car, light truck, heavy truck and bus fleets electric;

✔️ All water and space heating via heat pumps, or electric (not oil/gas);

✔️ Steel made via hydrogen/methane/electric arc;

✔️ Electrification of industry;

✔️ A carbon tax on domestic production, and a carbon border tax on imports from countries which do not have a carbon tax.

Is this doable?  Yes, but it will involve standing up to lobbies.  

What about agriculture?  By 2050, by far the biggest percentage of emissions will be from producing meat and dairy and the land clearing that goes with that.  At that point, taking on the agricultural lobbies will be unavoidable.  Maybe we should be starting right now.  You don't need to wait for legislation.  Just stop eating meat.