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Showing posts with label brown hydrogen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label brown hydrogen. Show all posts

Thursday, July 6, 2023

The hydrogen furphy

I've been suspicious about the hydrogen mania for a while now.   Michael Liebreich does a much better demolition job than I could.   But his recommendation to use green ammonia, made from green hydrogen, for long-term storage in electricity generation is very interesting.   And I don't share his doubts about using e-fuels for jets.  If e-fuels cost twice as much as jetfuel, so be it.  We survived without intercontinental jet flights before, and we could again.

[From BNEF]
By Michael Liebreich

Senior Contributor
BloombergNEF

Injecting some reality


Two years ago, BloombergNEF published my two-part primer on hydrogen, Separating Hype from Hydrogen. On the supply side, I was optimistic: green hydrogen (produced from renewable energy) would over time become cheaper than blue hydrogen (produced from natural gas but with carbon captured) and eventually cheaper than gray hydrogen (produced form natural gas without carbon capture).

On the demand side I was more skeptical. While clean hydrogen will be needed to decarbonize a number of use cases in industry, and perhaps for long-duration storage, I found it hard to identify any role for it in applications like land transportation or space heating. Since then, as I have done more work on industrial heat, I have even come to believe it has a limited role even there.

If my intention at the time was to inject some reality into discussions about hydrogen, I clearly failed. Rhetoric around hydrogen has become ever more overblown.

According to lobbying group the Hydrogen Council, citing a series of reports commissioned from McKinsey over the past three years, hydrogen can be expected to contribute more than 20 percent of emissions reductions needed for the world to reach net-zero emissions – a figure repeated by politicians and journalists seemingly without the slightest critical examination.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called hydrogen “the gas of the future” and promised “a huge boom.” Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has declared that “shifting to and developing a hydrogen society is critical for achieving decarbonization.” Frans Timmermans, the EU Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal believes that “hydrogen rocks.” Jacob Rees Mogg, briefly UK Secretary of State for Energy this year, called hydrogen “the silver bullet”.

Public money is starting to flow. The EU has approved the first 13 billion euros ($13.7 billion) of the 430 billion euros ($450 billion) promised under its 2020 Hydrogen Strategy and is now working to launch a “Hydrogen Bank”. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provides a ten-year tax rebate per kilogram of green hydrogen worth $3, which will soon be more than the production cost itself. Free hydrogen anyone?

Of supreme import


In October this year the Hydrogen Council and McKinsey released another report entitled Global Hydrogen Flows, predicting long-distance transport of 400 million tonnes of clean hydrogen and its derivatives (calculated on a hydrogen-content basis) by 2050, out of total global production of 660 million tonnes of hydrogen. It is worth bearing in mind that today, 94 million tonnes of hydrogen are used annually, virtually all of it made from fossil fuels, creating 2.3% of global emissions. The vast bulk of today’s hydrogen never leaves the compound on which it is made, let alone cross an international border.

The idea of hydrogen imports as a way of decarbonizing major industrialized economies is enormously seductive – so much so that Germany and Japan have made it central to their decarbonization strategies. Here’s Japanese PM Kishida again: “Japan aims to commercialize an international hydrogen supply chain by producing hydrogen in bulk at low cost in countries blessed with bountiful renewable energy resources coupled with marine transport infrastructure.”

Chancellor Scholz is promoting hydrogen imports not just as a way of decarbonizing the German economy, but as a replacement for Russian gas. In August he and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau flew to Newfoundland and Labrador to sign an agreement to “create a transatlantic supply chain for hydrogen well before 2030, with first deliveries aiming for 2025”. As I write this, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck is on a five-day trip to Namibia and South Africa to secure hydrogen supplies.

The problem with this vision of large-scale imports of hydrogen is that the physics of hydrogen is unlikely to play ball.

The unbearable lightness of hydrogen


In February this year, Kawasaki Heavy Industries’ Suiso Frontier arrived in Kobe, Japan carrying the world’s first ever cargo of liquid hydrogen from Australia. Did this momentous occasion herald the start of a brave new world of trade in liquid hydrogen, as the press coverage suggested? In a word, no.

Set aside the A$500 million ($334 million) cost of the project; set aside the fact that most of the hydrogen on board the Suiso Frontier was made from coal; and set aside the fire that broke out on board while loading. The 1,250 cubic metres of hydrogen carried by the Suiso Frontier contained just 0.2% of the energy content of a single large LNG carrier. Okay, the first ever LNG cargo, carried 63 years ago from the Calcasieu River on the Louisiana Gulf to the UK, consisted of a similarly picayune 2,475 tonnes. Surely liquid hydrogen can be scaled up in the same way as LNG has been? Kawasaki Heavy Industries, builder of the Suiso Frontier claims it has already lined up the first order for a much larger, 160,000 m3 carrier from Nippon Kaiji Kyokai.

This is where the physics of liquid hydrogen step in. Although the scaled-up vessel would carry 60% of the volume of an LNG Q-Max, it would carry only 22% of the energy.

Hydrogen has very good gravimetric energy density – the amount of energy carried per unit weight. On this measure, hydrogen beats diesel, petrol and jetfuel by a factor of around three, and LNG by a factor of 2.7 – which is why it makes a great rocket fuel. However, it has very poor volumetric energy density – the amount of energy carried per unit volume. It’s worth remembering that while a cubic meter of water weighs 1,000 kilograms; a cubic meter of hydrogen weighs only 71 kilograms.

On a volumetric basis, hydrogen’s energy density is a quarter that of jet fuel, and only 40% of that of LNG. Since ships are volume constrained (think Suez Canal, Panama Canal, etc.), this inevitably means more trips. Even if Kawasaki Heavy Industries was to scale its hydrogen carrier to the same size as a Q-Max, it would need to make 2.5 deliveries to carry the same amount of energy as one cargo of LNG. You don’t need to know anything at all about shipping to know that 2.5 times the trips are going to cost you 2.5 times as much.

But this is only the start. A liquid hydrogen carrier will inevitably be more expensive than an LNG carrier. Its load will be at -253C instead of -162C, and all pipes, valves, pumps and tanks have to resist hydrogen embrittlement. And because liquid hydrogen is both colder and lighter than LNG, the liquid hydrogen ship would have up to nine times more boil-off en route (these ships let some of the load boil off as heat enters the tanks, and then use that as fuel for their engines), unless you add either much more insulation or a complex cryogenic recycling system.

Overall, you would be wise to assume that the seaborne segment of your hydrogen trade will cost around four times the cost of LNG per unit energy.

It’s the physics, stupid


But that only deals with the seaborne segment. We still have to talk about liquefaction and regasification.

Liquefying hydrogen is a is a hugely energy-hungry process, made complex by the quirks of hydrogen physics – things like its negative Joule-Thomson Effect (unlike most gases, hydrogen gets warm when it expands and cold when compressed) and ortho-para isomer conversion (without which liquid hydrogen re-evaporates, irrespective of insulation). Liquefaction of hydrogen currently consumes 30-40% of its energy content, versus no more than 10% for LNG. Ways to improve this are being researched, but nothing can change the fact that liquefying hydrogen is, quite simply, a bear.

As for regasification, again the plants will be more expensive than for LNG. They need to operate at lower temperatures; all valves, pumps, pipes and tanks have to resist embrittlement; and compressors have to be of larger capacity because pressurizing hydrogen gas requires more work than pressurizing natural gas. European politicians, scrambling to build new terminals to receive LNG in replacement of Russian gas, are suggesting that these terminals will be repurposed to receive hydrogen or its derivatives. This is nonsense. You can re-use the docks and infrastructure, and any distribution pipelines can be upgraded, but 70% of everything else has to be scrapped.

In summary, while LNG approximately doubles the cost of gas delivered by pipeline, shipping liquid hydrogen will cost four to six times more than LNG. In other words, you can’t power an economy on imported liquid hydrogen, and that is not because of things that can be fixed – scale, technology, cost of capital and so on – but because of the underlying physics: volumetric density, liquefaction temperature and interactions with other materials.

It’s a gas, gas, gas!


If importing hydrogen in liquid form is out, what about importing hydrogen as a gas?

Here, things look much better. Gaseous hydrogen is already transported by pipeline – all the pipes, pumps, valves and tanks need to be appropriately engineered, but the economics are not terrible. Just as well, given the volume of hydrogen we are going to need at industrial “hydrogen hubs” for industrial uses and to provide long-duration back-up power.

Just replacing the current production of gray and black hydrogen would create demand for 94 million tonnes of clean hydrogen. Pipeline imports are well-placed to meet a decent proportion of this.

There is, however, a caveat. The longest natural gas pipeline in the world (excluding side branches) is Brazil’s National Unification Gas Pipeline (GASUN), just under 5,000 kilometers long. In their report on hydrogen trade, McKinsey and the Hydrogen Council predict 40 hydrogen “trade routes” connecting the globe. Those serving Europe by pipeline from Norway, North Africa and the Gulf are certainly feasible (the one from Russia is clearly off the cards for decades). However, none of the longer trade routes linking the US West Coast with Asia, the US East Coast with Europe, or the Gulf, Africa or Australia with Asia are likely to carry a single cubic meter of gaseous hydrogen.

There are a few companies proposing to carry compressed hydrogen gas by ship. This would allow them to avoid the cost and complexity of liquefaction but would expose them to the same problems of lower volumetric energy density, only more so. Provaris Energy has designed a ship carrying hydrogen gas at 250 bar. But this translates to just 25 kilograms of hydrogen per cubic meter – just over a third of the very poor volumetric density of liquid hydrogen. Scaled up to the size of a Q-Max, their ship would carry around one seventh of the energy. Seven ships to do the work of one, you can imagine what that does to costs.

There may be some niche applications for shipping gaseous hydrogen, for instance moving stranded supplies between islands, but it is not going to happen in more than homeopathic quantities.

The exotics


There are other ways of transporting hydrogen beyond liquid and gas. We’ll get on to derivatives of hydrogen in a moment, but first I want to deal with the exotics – liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs) and metal hydrides. Here the goal is to load hydrogen into a chemical or metal carrier, which allows it to be transported at ambient temperatures and pressures. On arrival the hydrogen is released and the carrier returned to the point of origin.

One promising LOHC is benzyl toluene, being marketed as a solution for hydrogen shipping by a company called Hydrogenious. But again it has a volumetric density problem. One cubic meter of benzyl toluene can only be loaded with 54 kilograms of hydrogen – which means four times as many trips for each energy cargo as you would have with LNG. In addition, loading hydrogen into the organic solvent is an exothermic process, generating heat where you don’t need it, and then you need to add energy at 300C at the arrival location to extract it – using up around 30% of the delivered energy.

That’s not to say LOHCs are not interesting: they could perhaps find a role in long-duration stationary storage – not everywhere has the salt caverns or depleted gas fields required to store gaseous hydrogen, but any tanker farm would be able to handle benzyl toluene and there may be options to store and reapply the process heat between cycles. There may even be a modest import market for LOHCs, to replenish long-duration storage tanks.

Metal hydrides offer the hope of transporting up to twice as much fuel per cubic meter as liquid hydrogen – but each family of hydrides studied so far has shown disadvantages: cost, gravimetric density, time to charge, absorptive capacity, heat required to release the hydrogen and so on. It would be a brave investor who thought we were going to move hydrogen at scale this way, when 50 years of research has not yielded as single commercial application.

First derivatives


Next up, hydrogen derivatives – e-methane, e-methanol. These are certainly easier to transport – drop-in replacements for their fossil equivalents. Their problem is high production cost. For each of them you need a source of clean hydrogen – whether blue, green, pink or red (from nuclear power, whichever color code you use) or whatever – plus a source of carbon nearby, and then you need to combine them into molecules of varying degrees of complexity.

The cheapest source of carbon would be captured from the combustion of fossil fuels – but that would make no sense as it would not be compatible with net zero. The only thing that could possibly make sense would be to use direct air capture (DAC) or secure carbon from a bio-based source, so that when it is burned it just returns to the atmosphere.

A bit of systems thinking, however, shows that even this makes no sense. Take e-methane. By the time you have gone to the cost of securing your carbon, why not just sequester it, instead of incurring further costs in producing hydrogen and combining them into your derivative. You could then just deliver plain old fossil gas to the importing country – along with a carbon credit if needed. That would be identical from a climate perspective and vastly cheaper.

Methanol can and must be made in future using clean hydrogen. Some of it will be made where hydrogen is cheap and exported, but only for use cases where it will be consumed as methanol. In 2022, global production of methanol was 110 million tonnes – but adjusting for molar weights, that is equivalent to just 14 million tonnes of hydrogen. Should demand double and a third of that get traded internationally, only a 9 million-tonne import market by hydrogen mass would be created. That barely scratches the surface of the Hydrogen Council’s 400 million tonnes.

E-methanol also represents a potential pathway to decarbonize shipping – but ammonia and waste-based biofuels both look like being cheaper. Even using nuclear power for the world’s largest ships would most likely be cheaper than e-methanol. Global shipping fuel demand today is around 300 million tonnes per year; let’s suppose, optimistically, that demand increases by 50% by 2050, that 20% is replaced by methanol, and a third of that methanol is traded internationally. Once you adjust for the molar mass and energy content of methanol, that would only create annual demand for another 8 million tonnes of hydrogen imports.

e-Fuels


Some continue to promote e-fuels as the solution for land transportation, particularly in Germany and Japan. They point to the fact such fuels require no changes in consumer behavior, highlight the millions of jobs that depend on the internal combustion engine and claim that scrapping 1.4 billion internal combustion vehicles on the world’s roads would be unaffordable.

Their arguments have no merit. First, those 1.4 billion vehicles will be scrapped anyway before whichever year countries select for net zero. In most cases, electric vehicles are already competitive on a total-cost-of-ownership basis with petrol and diesel. E-fuels, by contrast, will still be three to five times as expensive in 2050, driven by their production complexity and the efficiency losses at each production stage. Yes, Porsche is building a pilot project in Chile to produce e-fuels, but theirs is not exactly a cost-conscious customer base.

The fact is that those jobs associated with internal combustion engine manufacturing will be disappearing anyway, the only question is whether they are lost to other technologies or to China. As for behavioral change, most EV users like the fact that they can charge anywhere, rather than having to visit a gas station every week.

Flights of fancy


Time for a deep dive into hydrogen’s potential use in aviation. Airbus has said that it “considers hydrogen to be an important technology pathway to achieve our ambition of bringing a zero-emission commercial aircraft to market by 2035,” and this month, Rolls-Royce and EasyJet made the news by testing a turboprop engine on pure hydrogen.

It turns out that running an aircraft engine on hydrogen is not the difficult bit – the Soviet Union did it back in 1988, not on a test bench but in the air. The real problems are caused, once again, by the physics of hydrogen.

With just 25% of the energy density of kerosene, replacing the maximum take-off fuel load for a long-haul aircraft would require more space than the entire swept volume of its fuselage – a non-starter. For short-haul flights, the focus of Easyjet’s interest, the fuel tank would take up around a third of the fuselage. That means ticket prices 50% higher than now, even before paying for the higher costs of the plane, the cost of the liquid hydrogen, and cost of its ground handling equipment. In total, expect a doubling or tripling of prices.

The real show-stopper, however, is getting the fuel to the airport. Liquid hydrogen transfer lines exist, but there is no way to keep miles of pipeline at -253C and handle the safety issues of any potential leaks. That leaves road tankers or gas pipelines.

Let’s do a thought experiment: try to replace all 20,000 tonnes of jet fuel delivered daily to Heathrow airport with 7,200 tonnes of liquid hydrogen. By tanker truck, that would mean 2,300 daily movements of liquid hydrogen in West London. The safety and traffic implications don’t bear thinking about. Now the only option is to bring the hydrogen in by gas pipeline, and liquefy it on site. But that would require 2.7GW of electrical power, according to engineer and Oxford University ammonia expert Dr. Mike Mason – approximately the output of a new nuclear power station the size of Hinkley C, plus a lot of pylons. And then you need to dump enough heat to raise the temperature of the Thames by 18 degrees C.

The bottom line is that liquid hydrogen could perhaps end up powering a few executive jets – startup ZeroAvia certainly hopes so – but not aviation as we know it. The only substantial role for hydrogen in aviation would be through the production of e-fuels. These are certainly technically feasible – UK company Zero Petroleum has already made some – but they look like being at least twice as expensive as sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) based on agricultural or forestry waste.

If potential volumes of SAF are limited by feedstock availability, then there is a market opportunity for hydrogen in aviation fuels, if not, there isn’t. Global aviation fuel demand was around 300 million tonnes in 2019, which translates to 46 million tonnes on a hydrogen mass basis. If demand grows by 50%, 25% is met by e-jetfuel and one third of that is shipped internationally, that only generates 6 million tonnes of traded hydrogen.

Moan, moan, ammonia


That brings us, finally, to ammonia – the last option for those hoping to develop substantial long-distance hydrogen imports.

Around 190 million tonnes of ammonia are produced each year, mainly for fertilizer and as a chemical feedstock, almost all of it from fossil feedstock. Around 10 percent of current production is already traded internationally but this only comes to around three million tonnes by hydrogen mass.

Switching to clean ammonia for fertilizer production will without doubt drive a big increase in traded hydrogen. Where there are pipelines, hydrogen can be made where renewable power is cheap and imported in place of natural gas and used to make ammonia at the destination. Where there are no pipelines, green ammonia or finished fertilizer will be produced and shipped instead.

Supposing the fertilizer market grows by half by 2050, all of it goes low-carbon and a third of it ends up being shipped internationally, that would increase ammonia trading from 18 to 95 million tonnes per year – a lot of ammonia. This will be a relief for those investing in ammonia projects in Chile, Canada, Namibia and South Africa: their output may not find much use in the energy sector, but at least they should have access to a very substantial market. It is, however, only 17 million tonnes on a hydrogen mass basis.

Back to shipping fuels. Since ammonia will be cheaper than methanol, as discussed, let’s be optimistic and say half of the volumes described above are replaced with ammonia, and a third of it is traded internationally. That would drive an additional 25 million tonnes of demand by hydrogen mass.

Japan’s big bet


Japan is betting that imported ammonia will be used to generate power. Its national decarbonization plan is based on retaining its coal-fired power stations, but fueling them with increasing proportions of ammonia – first 20%, then 50%, then 100% by 2050. So confident is it – and so keen to keep selling its technology internationally – that it is encouraging Vietnam and other South-East Asian countries to keep building coal-fired power stations. Will the bet pay off?

Let’s look first at ammonia made from green hydrogen. That means generating wind and solar power; using it to produce hydrogen (80% efficiency); making ammonia via the Haber-Bosch process (70% efficiency); liquefying it (90% efficiency); shipping it (90% efficiency); and burning it to generate power (45% efficiency). Your end-to-end efficiency will be an astonishingly poor 20%. Although it might be possible to improve the efficiency of each of stage, the tyranny of multiple process steps means your end-to-end efficiency is hard to budge.

What 20% end-to-end efficiency means is that the resulting power will cost five times as much as the original power – and that is before accounting for capital invested in all those process stages and maintenance. In addition, combustion of ammonia produces nitrous oxides – hazardous to health and powerful greenhouse gases in their own right.

Now, ammonia from blue hydrogen. You eliminate the electrolysis stage, so your end-to-end efficiency is a little higher at 26%, but you have the extra cost of carbon capture and sequestration, so the resulting power cost is going to be about the same. The real question, however, is why bother? Why not just ship the natural gas to Japan instead of ammonia – LNG has 1.7 times the volumetric energy density of ammonia, so you need fewer cargoes. Then you capture the CO2 at the other end, and either sequester or send it back to the point of origin on the same ships. You have the same climate impact, approximately the same cost of carbon capture and sequestration, but significantly greater efficiency and lower shipping costs.

The bottom line for ammonia as a fuel for power generation, whether co-fired or pure, is that no economy can be internationally competitive based on the resulting power prices. My estimates are in line with the more detailed modelling work undertaken by BloombergNEF: BloombergNEF found that 100% ammonia-fired power in Japan would cost around $260 per megawatt-hour in 2030 and $200 by 2050 – around double the cost of renewable energy.

The fact that Japan could generate large amounts of renewable energy – in particular, offshore wind – at much lower cost points to the role that clean ammonia could in fact play in the country’s power system: providing back-up. Bill Gates likes to quote Vaclav Smil on the three-day cyclones that hit Tokyo almost every year – which would shut down renewable generation and leave it short of 22GW of power. He laughs at the idea that batteries could fill the resulting gap, and he is correct to do so. However, the gap is only 1,600 GWh, which could be generated from a million cubic meters of ammonia – an amount that could be brought in on just four Q-Max-sized carriers.

So, while basing Japan’s economy on electricity generated from imported ammonia is an economic non-starter, storing a few million tonnes of ammonia and using it for long-duration storage looks a lot more realistic.

Conclusions and implications


This has been a long journey and we have covered a lot of ground. I want to leave you with a few conclusions by way of summary.

The only way to move hydrogen economically is as a gas, by pipeline. Forget liquid hydrogen: it will struggle to find any role in the future energy or transport systems because of its poor volumetric energy density and difficulties with handling. It will have no role at all as a traded commodity.

Ammonia will be traded and transported, primarily for use in fertilizer production, plus as a shipping fuel. It will not be imported to power bulk power generation, but will be imported and stored to deliver long-duration storage. Some LOHC might also be imported, but only where it is stored for resilience purposes.

Clean methanol will be made near to sources of cheap clean hydrogen and some of it will be shipped around the world for use as a chemical feedstock. E-fuels – whether methanol, petrol, diesel or kerosene equivalents – will not be shipped around the world in meaningful volumes because their cost will severely limit their uptake, with the possible exception of aviation.

Totting up the various future hydrogen trade flows covered here, it is clear that the Hydrogen Council/McKinsey figures of 660 million tonnes of clean hydrogen production and 400 million tonnes of long-distance transportation are out by a factor of at least three. In addition, given that China and India have only pledged net zero by 2060 and 2070 respectively, such flows that do materialize will take decades beyond 2050.

The implications reach far beyond the question of international trade in hydrogen and its derivatives. The prohibitive cost of long-distance imports means that energy-intensive industries will inevitably migrate to regions with cheap clean energy. It is inconceivable for any country to import iron ore from Australia or Brazil, hydrogen from Australia, the Gulf, Canada or Africa, and make steel at a globally competitive cost. Magical thinking will be no defense against de-industrialization.

Finally, it is worth noting that none of this calls into question the fact that clean hydrogen will be required to decarbonize certain sectors, which will eventually create more than 100 million tonnes per year of demand. Just as railway mania left the world with railways, electricity mania left the world with power networks, and the dot-com bubble left the world with broadband fiber, so hydrogen mania will leave the world with a lot of clean hydrogen.

The worry is that, along the way, we are going to waste huge amounts of money on the wrong use cases for hydrogen and the wrong infrastructure in the wrong places. Worse than wasting money, we will also be wasting time – and that is the one thing we don’t have. Let’s be smart.

Selah.

Michael Liebreich is the founder and senior contributor to BloombergNEF. He is also the CEO and chair of Liebreich Associates, founding managing partner of EcoPragma Capital and an advisor to the U.K. Board of Trade.


Source: BNEF

 

Sunday, May 3, 2020

Largest green hydrogen plant in the world

Ningxia Hui region


From PV magazine:

Chinese coal miner Baofeng Energy has announced the start of construction of what it claims will be the world’s largest solar-powered hydrogen plant, in the Ningxia Hui autonomous region of northwest [north-central]China.

The RMB1.4 billion ($199 million) electrolysis project is intended to produce 160 million cubic meters of hydrogen per year plus 80 million cubic meters of oxygen. Baofeng said the use of solar electricity to power the facility would save 254,000 tons of coal consumption annually, leading to a 445,000-ton reduction in carbon emissions.

The project will feature two 10,000m3/hr electrolyzers powered by two 100 MW solar plants plus a 1,000kg/day hydrogenation station and two petrol stations will be converted to also supply natural gas and hydrogen for transport purposes. The solar panels will be installed over wolfberry and alfalfa crops which will generate extra revenue, according to Baofeng.

Work on the project started this month and is slated for completion this year, with hydrogen production to start next year.


However, the company is also going to produce "brown" hydrogen from coal, which is definitely not carbon-neutral:


Baofeng is also working on a coking co-generation plant to produce three million tons of coal-based coke per year, plus 1.2 billion cubic meters of hydrogen.

Saturday, December 21, 2019

Peak emissions closer than you think

Michael Liebreich is the doyen of energy change analysts.  He founded New Energy Finance which was bought by Bloomberg to become BNEF.  

I've taken extracts from this piece published on BNEF's blog.  (The emphases are mine)  If you don't want to read the whole piece, see my summary at the end.


I believe the new decade will see us hit peak energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and start to see a modest but meaningful decline. Just to be clear, we will not see the sort of decline demanded by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – a 20% cut by 2030 to keep temperature rises to 2C, a 45% cut to remain under 1.5C – but I would guess at a drop of around 5%.

Clearly that is not enough to put us fully on track to avoid appalling climate change impacts, and by 2030 we will have to admit 1.5C is out of reach. But it will be a game-changer: it will demonstrate to even the most pessimistic that we can bend the arc; it will end the feeling of helplessness and impending doom that has taken over our public discourse; and it will set us up for much more decisive reductions in the subsequent decades.

Optimism, therefore, but not without limits. It’s hard to be an unbridled optimist. Over the past decade, global emissions have risen by 15%. For one brief three-year period, between 2013 and 2016, they were flat – for the first time ever outside major recessions – but in 2017 they took off again, as the global economy boomed and China reverted to pumping cheap money into high-carbon infrastructure and building. Since then, emissions have been growing by around 1.2% per year.

[But,] while emissions grew 15% over the past decade, the global economy grew by 45%. On average, economic growth outstripped emissions growth by 2.4 percentage points per year.  [I.e, energy intensity fell by 2.4% p.a.] If that gap can be made to increase by just 1.4 percentage points, emissions peak, even in a growing economy. Increase it beyond that and we are over the hump: emissions will start to fall. Impossible pipe dream? Or something we will see in the course of the next decade?

First of all, the maths.  In 2017, a report by the World Resources Institute (WRI) showed that there were 49 countries, representing 36% of global emissions, which have already passed peak emissions [even though they have growing economies]. Almost the whole of the OECD is reducing its carbon footprint, even when you adjust for imports (something the ‘degrowth’ brigade pretend is impossible). The WRI expects a further eight countries, representing another 23% of emissions, to peak within the next decade.

Last week, in Paris, I attended the first meeting of the International Energy Agency’s Global Commission for Urgent Action on Energy Efficiency, of which I am a member. The Commission’s goal is to raise the rate of improvement in global energy intensity from its current 1.5% to 3% per year.

I have three main takeaways from the meeting: 1) energy efficiency is finally gaining recognition as a national priority in many countries, whether for climate or energy security reasons; 2) there is as much ‘low-hanging fruit’ today as there ever was; 3) there is a far better understanding of how to deliver improvements than a decade ago.

As we close out the decade, BNEF has concluded that around two-thirds of the world’s population now live in countries in which wind or solar are the lowest-cost ways of generating power. The world records for low-cost wind and solar are both now down to around $17/MWh. That is around a third of the cost of new gas-powered generation – even in the U.S., where there is a glut of cheap gas.  [Averages are of course higher, for both renewables and coal]

By 2030, I have no doubt whatsoever that the world record for low-cost onshore wind and solar will be below $10/MWh. It will probably be set in China, Morocco, Mexico or the Gulf states, who have been vying for leadership for the past decade. However, there is a chance it could be in India, Brazil, the U.S. or even Australia.

As we approach the final days of 2019, wind and solar are generating around 8.5% of global electricity. BNEF estimates that figure will be nearer 25% by 2030.

The biggest unanswered question, as renewable penetration grows, is whether the cost of managing intermittency will drop – with cheaper storage, growing demand-response capacity, business model innovation and smart policy design – as claimed by fans of renewables – or soar, as claimed by their opponents.
It’s a vital question, which will decide whether wind and solar can maintain their historical growth rates, or whether their penetration must soon saturate. All the main energy models are designed around the idea of renewable energy saturation: growth rates decelerating into the future – whether abruptly or slowly, but always markedly decelerating. The IEA’s central scenario, Stated Policies or SPS, has the combination of wind and solar reaching only 24% by 2040. BNEF’s NEO model, always more bullish, shows them at 39% in 2040 and 48% by 2050.

What if these models are wrong? What if learning, innovation and the co-evolution of demand-side industries continue to win the race against the physics of intermittency, and allow historical growth rates to continue for a few more decades?

Two decades ago everyone assumed that the cost of managing intermittency would soar after the first 5% of wind and solar entered the power mix; a decade ago we thought the inflection was 20%; now we know it is not this side of 40%. Modelling exercises around the world suggest that it is not until you reach 80% or more in any decently-connected grid that the cost of managing intermittency really starts to go vertical.  [But of course, by the time we get to 80% renewables, (a) storage costs will be much lower, and (b) overcapacity will be much cheaper]

To believe in a renewable energy singularity, the first thing to do is to extract all the latent flexibility in our current power systems, and then build more, in the form of power storage, demand response, long-distance interconnections and linkages with transport and heat. We’ll see a lot of that in the coming decade.

The second thing we need to do is learn to love overcapacity. As I said in a keynote in 2014, in a high-renewables system, overcapacity is not a bug, it’s a feature.

The average capacity factor of the world’s hydro plants is 42%; gas peaking plants 15%. Even so-called baseload coal plants run on average only 54% of the time. If technology is cheap, and demand or supply are intermittent, we overbuild. Wind and solar are no different.

Will we build many weeks’ worth of power storage, or hydrogen electrolysis, just to capture peak renewable electricity that would otherwise go to waste? In a word, no, because curtailment will be cheaper. Think about it: if your $20/MWh wind or solar suffers 33% curtailment, you know what happens? It turns into $30/MWh wind or solar – still half the price of power from any other source.

The third thing you would need to see if you want wind and solar to sustain their current growth rates is significant electrification of transport, (which I don’t think anyone doubts is on the cards – Daimler Benz clearly things so, for the first time in 135 years it is not working on the next generation of internal combustion engine) and heating (which, with global heat pump sales growing at 12% per year for the last decade, might finally be kicking off).

The fourth thing would be the electrification of industry and the generation of green fuels, be they hydrogen, ammonia or liquid fuels like methanol. It is hard to believe it was just 18 months ago that I wrote about this in Beyond Three Thirds: The Road to Deep Decarbonization, because there has been so much progress since.

BNEF’s seminal work on the cost of electrolysis suggests that green hydrogen (based on renewable power) will start to be competitive with brown hydrogen (from steam methane reforming of natural gas with no carbon capture) by 2030, and that by 2050 it will have a clear advantage. That means that, even in the absence of a carbon price, green hydrogen has the chance to eliminate the 5% of global emissions that currently result from fertilizer production and oil refining. A $20 carbon price would see it eat into the 2.2% of emissions from the global shipping industry. A $50 carbon price pushes green hydrogen into the 13% of industrial emissions from steel and concrete; and a $100 carbon price would take it into space heating, glass and other sectors. So the combination of cheap green hydrogen and a $100 carbon price will create an addressable market by 2050 of nearly 30% of global emissions. Neat.

Let’s talk about the fifth driver of a potential renewable singularity: batteries. By 2030, EV batteries will cost around $65/kWh at the pack level. [Assuming a compound 15% p.a. decline, $65/kWh will be reached in 2024] That’s $6,500 for the battery in a full-sized vehicle with a range of 300 miles; $13,000 gets you a 600-mile range – certainly bigger range than my bladder can handle. [And the batteries in small 'city cars' with 40 kWh will cost just $2600] 
All the pinch-points in the mineral supply chain will have been long ironed out, and by 2030, all end-of-life batteries will be recycled – if there are any.

Yes, you read that right. Solid-state batteries may or may not have hit the market, delivering four-times the energy density, and launching swarms of electric planes. But there will certainly have been continued progress in lithium-ion technology towards the “million-mile EV battery”, which can deliver 10,000 charge cycles. It will make possible either cars with 50-year lives, ubiquitous vehicle-to-grid business models, or second-use applications at scale – or all three. Mindblowing.

Oh, and by 2030, you will not even remember about range anxiety – the same way you don’t remember that there were once insufficient modems to connect to the internet, or insufficient bandwidth for online video. 

Those who doubt the value of renewable energy in addressing climate change always point to negligible impact so far. Even at 8.5% penetration into power demand – and after investment of $2.7 trillion – wind and solar have only reduced global emissions by only around 2.5% from where they would otherwise have been. They have so far failed to absorb growth in energy demand.

That is to miss the point. As leading energy economist Professor Michael Grubb has pointed out in Conditional Optimism: Perspectives on Deep Decarbonisation, the key clean technologies are growing according to the dynamics of logistic curves, penetrating into incumbent technologies. Professor Grubb uses lots of fancy economics to forecast what might happen next. I’ll paraphrase: in a logistic curve penetration, the first 1% takes forever; from 1% to 5% is like waiting for a sneeze –it is going to be explosive, you just don’t know when it will happen; 5% to 50% happens much faster than you think – that is when the restructurings and bankruptcies happen.

No single “sneeze” will wipe out fossil fuel use across energy and transport; It will occur sector by sector, country by country. Over the past six years, LED light-bulbs have gone from less than 5% global market share to over 40%; coal power in the U.K. from 40% to a couple of percent; plug-in vehicles in Norway from less than 5% to over 50%. In each case, there was a slow start, an agonizing wait, and then the sneeze. Bless you!

What does all this mean for coal consumption? According to Global Energy Monitor (formerly Coalswarm), in the final 2.5 years of this decade, global coal capacity grew by an average of 56GW or 2.8% per year – which hardly looks like a harbinger of peak emissions.

India and China alone have between them a pipeline of 280GW of new plants, bigger than the entire current U.S. fleet and equivalent to 15% of current global capacity. However, this does not begin to tell the full story.

First, what really matters is not capacity, but how much coal is actually burned. Over the past decade, capacity factors for thermal generation have been falling around the world, in China’s case to record lows. Globally – not that you would know it from the mainstream news – coal consumption in the power sector has been flat since 2012; preliminary figures for 2019 show a drop of around 3%.

Just this month it was announced that over half of the power plants operated by China’s Big Five state-owned utilities are running at a loss. The government has plans for up to one third of them to shut by 2021, removing 15% of the country’s coal capacity. As for India, despite its 85GW pipeline, on average it has commissioned less than 10GW per year for the past three years. This September, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a push for 450GW of zero-carbon generation by 2030.

In the EU, eight out of 28 countries have already committed to phasing out coal by 2030; it will be entirely gone in the U.K. by 2025.  Germany, having prioritized the closure of nuclear over coal to date, will be off coal by 2038. The EU’s Green Deal, announced last week by new President Ursula von der Leyen, included 35 billion euros of support for Poland and other countries to get off coal.

In the U.S., despite promises to end the so-called “war on coal”, more coal capacity has been shuttered under President Trump’s first term than during any three years of the Obama administration.  Every publicly-quoted coal company has gone through Chapter 11 since 2016, as has privately-owned Murray Energy, whose CEO, Robert Murray, wrote the blueprint for the president’s energy policy. Not one new coal plant has been built since 2015. None are being built today, and it looks like none ever will be again.

Of course, coal is used outside the electricity sector, notably in heating and industry. That source of demand looks likely to carry on increasing for a few years at least.

Before 2000, the orthodox view of oil demand (and energy analysts always default to orthodoxy) was that by 2030 it would grow to around 130 million barrels. By 2000, oil demand was still expected to grow forever, but it would reach only 120 million barrels by 2030. By 2010, the accepted wisdom was still endless growth, but only 105 million barrels of demand by 2030. See the pattern? Oil demand growth consistently undershooting the growth predicted by experts.

At no point did it cross the experts’ minds that maybe the same trends that they kept missing would see oil demand peak, and then start to fall. When I first suggested it in 2015, it felt like a transgressive act.

Today, there is not an oil company in the world that is not talking about peak demand. Even Saudi Aramco’s recent IPO prospectus predicted “a levelling-off around 2035”. BNEF expects demand from light and heavy vehicles to peak in 2030; this is one of the rare times I depart (slightly) from its view. I see peak road transport demand around 2025; add in the growing areas of air transport, shipping and petrochemicals, and I think we’ll see peak oil this side of 2030.

So far, you will notice I have barely mentioned policy. The picture I have painted is a bit like the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario: these trends, which should see emissions from fossil fuels peak by 2030, are what I see happening even in the absence of significant further policy in favor of climate action.
But, of course, there will be further climate policy – and lots of it.
In the U.K., the new Johnson government is committed to achieving net zero by 2050. At this September’s Climate Action Summit in New York, 77 other countries, 10 regions and over 100 cities announced their intention to follow the U.K.’s lead. As I write this, the EU has just unveiled its Green Deal, which is going to enshrine a 2050 net zero target in law, as well as a plan to reduce greenhouse gases by “at least 50% and towards 55% by 2030, in a responsible way”.

In Canada, Justin Trudeau hung on to government, albeit not his parliamentary majority, in this year’s General Election. The country is therefore the first to implement the sort of tax-and-dividend scheme that could be a model for carbon pricing in political economies where new taxes are all but impossible to impose.

In the U.S., climate is a key battleground for the Democratic Party Primary, but what is more interesting is that Republicans with an eye on political life after President Trump are finally conceding they too need a climate policy.

Even the international climate negotiations should be expected to deliver some level of positive mood music over the coming decade, despite the potential withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement and the failure of the latest COP conference in Madrid, as I describe in the sister-piece to this article, Climate Wars Episode IV – a New Hope for the 2020s?.

So there you have it – the reasons why I believe we will see peak fossil fuel emissions during the coming decade. 


The small inset chart shows atmospheric concentrations of CO2, the larger chart annual increases in CO2 concentrations.
RCP means representative concentration pathway.  RCP2.6 would be consistent with a 1 degree C rise in temps, RCP4.5 1.8 degrees C.  Liebreich's analysis suggests something between RCP2.6 and RCP4.5.  If emissions only peak in the late 2020s, policy shifts as panic about climate change increases could lead to a much steeper decline thereafter.


To sum up:


  • Renewables are going to get insanely cheap.
  • Thermal coal demand will peak before 2030
  • Peak oil is within sight
  • The green hydrogen/methane economy will be cost competitive by 2030, and at $100/tonne carbon price, will replace 30% of emissions
  • energy saving still has plenty of low hanging fruit.
  • renewables overcapacity will be a design feature in electricity generation.
  • CO2 emissions will peak before 2030, and by 2030, will be 5% lower than they are now
I've made a lot of these points before.  Liebreich makes them better, and with greater authority.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

A hydrogen-powered plane



From TriplePundit


The clean energy revolution means more than simply replacing fossil fuels with low-carbon alternatives. Clean technology can also provide extra benefits for companies in terms of productivity, comfort and convenience. A case in point is the hydrogen plane startup ZeroAvia. The company has just emerged from “stealth” mode to offer the world’s first commercial aircraft with a hydrogen fuel cell powertrain as its exclusive means of locomotion.

ZeroAvia’s business model is based on the premise that its hydrogen fuel cell powertrain will reduce the cost of flight on small, 10-20 seat aircraft, targeting short-haul journeys of up to 500 miles.

With the ability of the company's hydrogen plane to compete on cost for passengers against large conventional jets, ZeroAvia is anticipating that business travelers will be attracted by the opportunity to fly into smaller regional airports.

Ideally, the increased flexibility in choice of destinations will reduce the potential for delayed flights and long security lines that often bedevil larger airports.

Hydrogen fuel cell passenger cars have been slow to take off, partly due to their relatively high cost and lack of a mature fuel distribution network for motorists.

Those two issues are not significant barriers for ZeroAvia’s hydrogen fuel cell aircraft, however.

The company is anticipating a per-flight cost savings of about 50 percent for its powertrain compared to conventional jet aircraft. Higher power train efficiency is one key difference. Lower fuel and maintenance costs will also factor in.

To help reduce costs farther, ZeroAvia has adopted a “power-by-the-hour” engine lease model commonly used in the aircraft industry, in which customers pay only for the hours that they use the powertrain. The cost of fuel and maintenance will be picked up by ZeroAvia as part of the lease.

Hydrogen fuel cells produce no airborne pollutants. The only emission is water, resulting from the interaction of hydrogen with oxygen in the fuel cell.

Still, the supply chain for hydrogen is front-loaded with pollutants and environmental impacts because the primary source for hydrogen today is natural gas.

Air Liquide has committed to decarbonizing hydrogen production for energy-related applications through its Blue Hydrogen initiative.

For its short-term goal, the company has pledged carbon-free production for at least 50 percent of hydrogen in the energy category by 2020 -- in other words, by next year. Biogas, water-splitting (using electricity sourced from renewables) and carbon recycling are the three main pathways identified by the company.

Air Liquide’s timetable for renewable hydrogen improves the prospects for ZeroAvia to reduce its supply chain emissions.

ZeroAvia is looking at the year 2022 to introduce its new fuel cell aircraft to the market, and earlier this year Air Liquide announced it would ramp up carbon-free hydrogen production at an existing facility just across the border from the U.S. in Canada.

[Read more here]

Brown hydrogen is made from coal, blue hydrogen from natural gas and green hydrogen via electrolysis using green electricity.  The supporters of a hydrogen economy say that supporting blue hydrogen will lead to economies of scale which will then allow the introduction of green hydrogen.  For example, this page from Oz gas producer Woodside. 

I'm not altogether convinced.  The problem with blue hydrogen is not economies of scale.  It's cost, because the chemical bonds between oxygen and hydrogen in the form of water are so strong it requires lots of energy to break them apart during electrolysis.   ZeroAvia's relative cheapness, I suspect, depends on blue hydrogen, not green. 

That's doesn't mean ZeroAvia's project is completely pointless.  Green hydrogen produced by renewable electricity that would otherwise be curtailed because there is surplus electricity in the grid is cheap.  Curtailment will increase rapidly as we increase the percentage of renewables in the grid.  And it may be possible that the CO₂ produced as a by-product of the production of blue hydrogen could be dissolved in water and pumped into basalt where it turns into rock.  On the other hand, compressing and delivering the CO₂ to far-off locations increases the cost and energy usage.

For now, blue hydrogen is more efficient and much less polluting than petroleum or jet-fuel, so it is half a step forward.  Air Liquide's commitment to producing 50% green hydrogen as part of its total hydrogen production is good news.  Progress comes from small steps, as long as they're all in the same direction.