Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts

Thursday, March 27, 2025

Record car loan delinquency

 From Barchart


Not good.  If recession bites in the US --- and that seems increasingly likely --- this indicator suggests strains on consumer spending and banks' loan books, worsening the downturn.

Note strong seasonality.
I don't have the data, so I can't seasonally adjust them for you.


Friday, May 5, 2023

Half of America's banks insolvent



From The Age




The twin crashes in US commercial real estate and the US bond market have collided with $US9 trillion ($13.5 trillion) uninsured deposits in the American banking system. Such deposits can vanish in an afternoon in the cyber age.

The second- and third-biggest bank failures in US history have followed in quick succession. The US Treasury and the Federal Reserve would like us to believe that they are “idiosyncratic”. That is a dangerous evasion.

Almost half of America’s 4800 banks have already burnt through their capital buffers and are running on negative equity. They may not have to mark all losses to market under US accounting rules, but that does not make them solvent. Somebody will take those losses.

“It’s spooky. Thousands of banks are underwater,” said Professor Amit Seru, a banking expert at Stanford University. “Let’s not pretend that this is just about Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic. A lot of the US banking system is potentially insolvent.”

The full shock of monetary tightening by the Fed has yet to hit. A great edifice of debt faces a refinancing cliff-edge over the next six quarters. Only then will we learn whether the US financial system can safely deflate the excess leverage induced by extreme monetary stimulus during the pandemic.

A Hoover Institution report by Professor Seru and a group of banking experts calculates that more than 2315 US banks are currently sitting on assets worth less than their liabilities. The market value of their loan portfolios is $US2 trillion lower than the stated book value.

These lenders include big beasts. One of the 10 most vulnerable banks is a globally systemic entity with assets of over $US1 trillion. Three others are large banks. “It is not just a problem for banks under $US250 billion that didn’t have to pass stress tests,” he said.

The US Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) thought they had stemmed the crisis by bailing out uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank with a “systemic risk exemption” after these lenders collapsed in March.

The White House baulked at a blanket guarantee for all deposits because that would look like social welfare for the rich. Besides, the FDIC has only $US127 billion of assets (and less very soon) and may ultimately require its own bailout.

The authorities preferred to leave the matter vague, hoping that depositors would discern an implicit guarantee. The gamble failed. Depositors fled First Republic Bank at a fast and furious pace last week despite an earlier infusion of $US30 billion from a group of big banks.

White knights probing a possible takeover of First Republic recoiled once they examined the books and discovered the scale of real estate damage. The FDIC had to seize the bank, wiping out both shareholders and bondholders. It took a $US13 billion subsidy along with $US50 billion of loans to entice JP Morgan to pick up the pieces.

“No buyer would take First Republic without a public subsidy,” said Krishna Guha from Evercore ISI. He warns that hundreds of small and mid-sized banks will batten down the hatches and curb lending to avoid the same fate. This is how a credit crunch begins.

The share price of PacWest, the next on the sick list, fell as much as 60 per cent in after-hours trading on Wednesday. That will be the bellwether of what happens next.

The US authorities can contain the immediate liquidity crisis by guaranteeing all deposits temporarily. But that does not address the greater solvency crisis.

The Treasury and the FDIC are still in the denial phase. They blame the failures on reckless lending, bad management, and over-reliance on footloose uninsured depositors by a handful of banks. This has a familiar ring. “They said the same thing when Bear Stearns went down in 2008. Everything was going to be all right,” said Seru.

First Republic lends to technology start-ups, but it chiefly came unstuck on commercial real estate. It will not be the last on that score. Office blocks and industrial property are in the early stage of a deep slump.

“Where we stand today is a nearly perfect storm,” said Jeff Fine, real estate guru at Goldman Sachs.

“Rates have gone up 400 to 500 basis points in a year, and financing markets have almost completely shut down. We estimate there’s four to five trillion [US] dollars of debt in the commercial (property) sectors, of which about a trillion is maturing in the next 12 to 18 months,” he said.

Packages of commercial property loans (CMBS) are typically on short maturities and have to be refinanced every two to three years. Borrowing exploded during the pandemic when the Fed flooded the system with liquidity. That debt comes due in late 2023 and 2024.

Could the losses be as bad as the subprime crisis? Probably not. Capital Economics says the investment bubble in US residential property peaked at 6.5 per cent of GDP in 2007. The comparable figure for commercial property today is 2.6 per cent.

But the threat is not trivial either. US commercial property prices have so far fallen by just 4 per cento 5 per cent. Capital Economics expects a peak to trough decline of 22 per cent. This will wreak further havoc on the loan portfolios of the regional banks that account for 70 per cent of all commercial property financing.

“In a worst-case scenario, it could create a ‘doom loop’ which accelerates a real estate downturn that then feeds back into the banking system,” said Neil Shearing, the group’s chief economist.

Silicon Valley Bank’s travails were different. Its sin was to park excess deposits in what is supposed to be the safest financial asset in the world: US treasuries. It was encouraged to do so under the risk-weighting rules of the Basel regulators.

Some of these debt securities have lost 20 per cent on long maturities – a theoretical paper loss only until you have to sell them to cover deposit flight.

The US authorities say the bank should have hedged this Treasury debt with interest rate derivatives. But as the Hoover paper makes clear, hedging merely transfers losses from one bank to another bank. The counterparty that underwrites the hedge contract takes the hit instead.

The root cause of this bond and banking crisis lies in the erratic behaviour and perverse incentives created by the Fed and the US Treasury over many years, culminating in the violent lurch from ultra-easy money to ultra-tight money now under way. They first created “interest rate risk” on a galactic scale: now they are detonating the delayed timebomb of their own creation.

Chris Whalen from Institutional Risk Analyst said we should be wary of a false narrative that pins all blame on miscreant banks. “The Fed’s excessive open market intervention from 2019 through 2022 was the primary cause of the failure of First Republic as well as Silicon Valley Bank,” he said.

Mr Whalen said US banks and bond investors (ie pension funds and insurance companies) are “holding the bag” on $US5 trillion of implicit losses left by the final blow-off phase of the Fed’s QE experiment.

“Since US banks only have about $US2 trillion in tangible equity capital, we have a problem,” he said.

He predicts that the banking crisis will keep moving up the food chain from the original outliers to mainstream banks until the Fed backs off and slashes rates by 100 basis points.

The Fed has no intention of backing off. [It raised rates further this week to the highest level in 16 years, and chair Jerome Powell warned not to expect any rate cuts this year]. It continues to shrink the US money supply at a record pace, with $US9 billion of quantitative tightening each month.

The horrible truth is that the world’s superpower central bank has made such a mess of affairs that it has to pick between two poisons: either it capitulates on inflation, or it lets a banking crisis reach systemic proportions. It has chosen a banking crisis.

 

The rise in the US discount rate from 1% in 2004 to 5.3% in 2006
led to the GFC.  The rise this cycle has been even larger.



Tuesday, May 2, 2023

A debt crunch is looming

 From Bloomberg


Just when it seemed the US regional banking strains were starting to ease, First Republic Bank has leaped back into headlines, reigniting concerns of rising pain in the lending system.

Banks increased emergency borrowing from the Federal Reserve for the second week in a row in a sign of the ongoing stress in the system. Last week, the New York Fed reported that financial conditions in its region had deteriorated sharply.

The trouble is rekindling concern that a credit crunch is underway. And it further complicates the plan for next week’s Fed policy meeting, where officials have to figure out how to balance the risks of tighter borrowing conditions against stubbornly high inflation.

Below are six charts that help explain why and how borrowing is getting harder in vast parts of the economy:

Lending Contraction


“Lending from U.S. banks is poised to contract over the next few quarters,” Amanda Lynam, head of macro credit research at BlackRock Financial Management wrote in a note on Thursday. Headwinds to profitability including higher deposit costs have seen bank spreads underperform relative to non-financials, she wrote.




Money Supply


The blow to credit availability comes as the money supply shrinks, a sign that the spike in interest rates by the Fed is causing money to exit the banking system, shrinking the availability of loans. That could slow the economy, with monetarist economists suggesting it could herald a crash and deflation.The Dallas Fed and the San Francisco Fed last week reported pressure on funding in their geographic regions, with projects being canceled and nonperforming loans expected to increase.



[See my piece about money supply, here]

Consumer Headwinds


Banks that posted quarterly results this month said they boosted provisions on bad consumer loans to levels not seen since the early days of the pandemic. For example, Capital One Financial Corp. increased its provision for credit card losses by more than 300% to $2.26 billion compared with a year earlier. The firms have generally said the rising provisions are just consumers returning to pre-pandemic norms.



Office Woes


Capital One also set aside more money to cover souring office loans, as vacancies rise and many workers choose to work from home. Morgan Stanley has previously estimated that office property valuations could fall as much as 40% from peak to trough, increasing the risk of defaults.





Another emerging source of stress in credit is the leveraged loan market as corporate borrowers with floating-rate debt struggle to keep pace with higher borrowing costs.

Higher Defaults


The amount of loans trading at distressed prices, defined as below 80% of face value, has jumped 26% to about $127 billion since the end of February, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That compares with a 10% increase for bonds to about $488 billion.

“We believe the loan market, which has historically had a lower default rate than the high yield bond market, will record a higher rate during this cycle,” Armen Panossian and Danielle Poli, managing directors at Oaktree Capital Management LP, wrote in a memo last week. “This is due to the covenant-lite nature of most loans and the rising prevalence of loan-only capital structures.”




Credit Chatter


Company executives worldwide, meanwhile, are talking about credit on conference calls at the highest rate since the pandemic hit, according to data compiled by Bloomberg News. Some mentions include Evercore Inc.’s Chief Executive Officer John Weinberg noting an increase in restructuring and liability management business and Peabody Energy Corp. investor relations vice president Karla Kimrey saying the company has positioned itself to avoid uncertain credit markets.


Sunday, April 24, 2022

Household debt flashing red

 This is important because in the past high levels of household debt relative to income/GDP have subsequently led to recessions, as happened in the US before the GFC (global financial crisis)

From a tweet by Phil Oliver


“Our risk map identifies ten countries where the danger from household debt is flashing red and the threat of this leading to financial crisis”

“The countries where we found the greatest specific concern meanwhile were Australia, Canada….” 

See his source.

 






Thursday, May 21, 2020

After the war is over ...

(Sung to the time of 'After the ball is over', and I mean the war against the coronavirus)

Most governments in developed countries are running deficits relative to  GDP which they haven't done since the WWII.   And the question is, what will they do after we have contained the coronavirus or even found a vaccine and a cure?  One alternative is to try to cut spending and raise taxes to pay back the outstanding debt.  This is the conventional wisdom today.  The trouble is, because government spending is such a large chunk of total spending, if the government slashes spending, it will cause economic activity to decline.  

After  WWII, guided by the insights of John Maynard  Keynes, most western countries didn't do this.  Instead, they relied on economic growth to reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios.  They continued to borrow money to fund infrastructure investments.  Despite this, their debt ratios declined.  

When interest rates and bond yields are zero or even negative, it's a sign that inflation and growth expectations are so low that private investment spending isn't and won't be enough to get growth going again.   The best way to increase growth when this happens is for the government to build infrastructure funded with debt.  This way, not only is overall demand in the economy increased, but it also adds to supply.  By building freeways, urban/light rail, high-speed long distance rail, schools, wind farms, the grid, etc., the productive capacity of the economy is increased.  Cutting interest rates doesn't necessarily add to demand when interest rates are already low.  Debt-funded infrastructure spending does.

As long as the budget deficit's percentage of GDP is below the nominal rate of GDP growth, the total outstanding debt as a percentage of GDP will continue to decline.  And as long as the borrowings are used to fund projects which add to productive capacity, they are sound.


Public debt to GDP was huge after WW2. Didn’t stop massive public investment in jobs, public housing, education and health. Debt diminished as economic growth kicked in.

We must ignore right wing fear campaigns on debt and rebuild a better more caring and productive society.


I think he's right.  Countries which try to pay down debt using austerity, will grow more slowly than those which try to stimulate growth using deficit spending to fund infrastructure.

Wednesday, April 1, 2020

Debt and deficits after coronavirus

A fascinating chart from Getup!

See how Federal deficits in Australia surged during both world wars, as did the ratio of outstanding debt to GDP.  For example, the (Federal) deficit to GDP ratio peaked in 1944 at 20%.  The debt to GDP ratio peaked at over 100% two years later.  The debt to GDP ratio didn't fall because the Federal government ran a surplus (though there was a small one in 1949) but because the denominator in the equation rose.  Debt to GDP  was high in all post-war belligerent economies, not just Australia.  But they understood the thesis that Keynes had made, which was that raising taxes and cutting expenditure to repay debt was counter-productive, because these actions reduced economic activity, so although the deficits naturally reduced as war ended, they didn't attempt to create fiscal surpluses as had been done after WW1.   The truth of Keynes's theory was conclusively demonstrated during the Euro crisis of 2011, when forced deficit reduction led to a "double-dip" recession.

Once again, governments are running large fiscal deficits, to keep economies afloat during the covid crash.  And it will be interesting to see whether "austerity", which has been discredited again and again, will be introduced after the recession is over to pay back sharply higher debt levels, or whether they'll do as most economies did after the war, and allow the ratio of debt to GDP to fall as a result of economic growth.

There is in any case a difference between debt incurred to fund the construction of capital goods (railways, roads, schools, housing, factories) and debt incurred to fund current expenditure (wages and salaries, running costs, etc.)  It makes sense to fund, say, a railway with bonds, repayable over 25 or 30 years.  However, only in the rarest circumstances, borrowing to fund current expenditures is unwise.  This is one of those rare circumstances.