Highest sea temperature since 1850

 From Zack Labe

🚨 The last three months have averaged the highest global mean sea surface temperature on record relative to any other May-June-July period since records started in 1850... Data from the new @noaa.gov  ERSSTv6. 🌊

 

 El Niño will push these temperatures even higher over the next year,   

Yet we still do not act.   We should:

✔️ Accelerate the phase-out of coal and gas in electricity generation ASAP. ✔️ Ban the import and production of new petrol-/diesel-only vehicles ✔️Ban oil/gas building heating ✔️Tax imports from countries which won't do the same.

January was 1.75 C above pre-industrial temperatures!!!

 From Leon Simons

First 28 days of 2025 were 1.75°C above pre-industrial!  Even with La Niña cooling the planet down somewhat, this will be the hottest January in history.   The Global warming rate might have more than doubled!

Accelerated warming

 From Prof Eliot Jacobson

Below is the latest monthly global surface temperature anomaly graphic, with a quadratic trendline (in other words, assuming accelerating warming). What's new? This updated trendline shows us passing 1.5°C later this year and 2.0°C in 2036.

The vast majority of people want climate action

 From Katharine Heyhoe

On climate, did you know that only 11% of people in the US (and even smaller percentages in Canada, the UK, Australia and beyond) are dismissive? 

Yet because their voices are so loud and persistent, people often think they’re 50%. 

This is why I advocate so strongly for using YOUR voice!

 

Austria's temperatures 3.5 degrees C above 1800s

 From a toot by O=C=O

#Vienna - with temperature records since 1775.

#showYourStripes

https://showyourstripes.info/c/globe

This year or next, the average temperature for the globe will have risen 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.  But that is the average, and it includes oceans.  Even though the world's seas are warming terrifyingly fast, they're still cooler than the land.  Austria's temperatures have risen 3.5 degrees since pre-industrial times.  Isn't it time to start panicking?  Why do we drift along, comatose with stupidity, phiffing and phaffing, instead of taking resolute and effective action?

UK already experiencing disruptive climate change

 From The BBC

The UK is already undergoing disruptive climate change with increased rainfall, sunshine and temperatures, according to scientists.  The year 2020 was the third warmest, fifth wettest and eighth sunniest on record, scientists said in the latest UK State of the Climate report.  No other year is in the top 10 on all three criteria.

The experts said that, in the space of 30 years, the UK has become 0.9C warmer and 6% wetter.

The report's lead author Mike Kendon, climate information scientist at the UK Met Office, told BBC News: “A lot of people think climate change is in the future – but this proves the climate is already changing here in the UK.

“As it continues to warm we are going to see more and more extreme weather such as heatwaves and floods.”

The report says the UK has become hotter, sunnier and rainier:

• 2020 was the third warmest UK year since 1884; all the years in the top 10 are since 2002
• Last year was one of the least snowy on record; any snow mainly affected upland and northern areas
• Spring 2020 was the UK’s sunniest on record, and sunnier than most UK summers.
• 2020 was the UK’s fifth wettest year; six of the 10 wettest years have been since 1998

Scientists warn of worse extreme weather if global temperatures rise and politicians fail to curb carbon emissions.

And in a separate report, scientists warned that greenhouse gas levels were already too high “for a manageable future for humanity“.

Liz Bentley, head of the Royal Meteorological Society, said that even if governments could achieve the challenging outcome of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5C – which looks very unlikely - that would still lead to a 10% increase in the amount of water the air can hold.

“In the UK,” she said, “we are likely to see temperatures of 40C. As we get 1.5C warming, that’ll be something we see on a regular basis.

"People don’t realise that even a small temperature rise of 0.1 or 0.2 degrees overall can make a huge difference – especially in the frequency and intensity of extreme events.

“We had roads melting last year, rails start to buckle, electric cabling starts to buckle. We often say we’d like a climate like the Med, but people were soon complaining they were too hot - not just in the day but especially at night.

“It often takes a massive high-impact event to change attitudes to the climate – so let’s hope what’s been happening recently with extreme weather will raise the will to tackle the problem.”

The State of the Climate report also indicates that plants are responding to the changes in climate. Leaves appeared on average 10.4 days earlier than the 1999-2019 baseline for a range of common shrub and tree species.

Climate panic

 From The Economist

The ground under the German town of Erftstadt is torn apart like tissue paper by flood waters; Lytton in British Columbia is burned from the map just a day after setting a freakishly high temperature record; cars float like dead fish through the streets-turned-canals in the Chinese city of Zhengzhou. All the world feels at risk, and most of it is. Six years ago, in Paris, the countries of the world committed themselves to avoiding the worst of climate change by eliminating net greenhouse-gas emissions quickly enough to hold the temperature rise below 2°C. Their progress towards that end remains woefully inadequate. But even if their efforts increased dramatically enough to meet the 2°C goal, it would not stop forests from burning today; prairies would still dry out tomorrow, rivers break their banks and mountain glaciers disappear. And even if everyone manages to honour their pledges, there is still a risk that temperatures could eventually rise by 3°C above pre-industrial levels.

What happens when climate panic occurs?  I feel that that isn't far away.

Well, for a start, net-zero by 2050 will be unceremoniously dumped, and the net-zero target will be brought forward by at least a decade.  The world would go on a war footing to cut emissions.  

Just how fast could we cut emissions?  To cut emissions by 50% by 2030 would require that emissions would have to fall by a cumulative 7.5% per annum.  Could we do that without a catastrophic collapse in economic activity?  Well, in a word, yes.  

Roughly 30% of the world's emissions come from baseload electricity and another 12% from variable electricity (gas peaking).  Wind and solar are already cheaper than coal and (in gas-importing countries) than gas too.   We can take the grid to 85% wind and solar with 4 hours of storage.   The remainder could be supplied by nuclear, hydro, biomass, wave power or green gas (hydrogen or green ammonia or green methane, produced from surplus renewable electricity).  And climate panic may well reduce public hostility to nuclear power.  Existing nuclear generators will prolly be allowed to continue.  SMRs (small modular reactors) may be built, though they're unlikely to be ready in time.

Another 16% of global emissions come from road transport.  Governments could simply ban the sale of new internal combustion engine cars, lorries and buses, and they probably will, not from 2030 or 2035 bur from 2025 or earlier.  They will set stringent annual targets to get to this point, or they will introduce big subsidies for EVs, or both.  With climate panic, a slow recasting of our economies will be ditched in favour of a very rapid adjustment.  With an average life of 10 years, it will take 10 years for the whole fleet to transition to plug-ins, so that process will have to be accelerated.  There will be 'cash for clunkers' programs, designed to take aging petrol cars and trucks off the roads.  Petrol (gasoline) will be taxed more heavily.  ICEV licence fees will be upped.

And governments will be looking at every source of emissions.  Iron and steel will have to switch to making steel with green hydrogen or methane.  Air travel will be taxed heavily unless it's electric or fuelled by carbon-neutral jetfuel.  

All land clearing and forest burning would have to stop immediately.  The world would have to apply sanctions in the form of diplomatic pressure and import tariffs and bans to the countries  where this is worst: Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Borneo.  And don't think we won't.  As climate panic builds, the pressure to conform will be irresistible.

Agriculture won't be given a free pass any more, either.  Cows will be fed seaweed, to cut emissions.  Governments may even become frightened enough to tax meat. 

But above all, the world needs a carbon tax and an end to fossil fuel subsidies.  The EU's border carbon tax will be a powerful goad for the rest of the world to introduce their own carbon taxes.  Climate panic will remove any opposition to their spread.  Climate free-loaders will get short shrift.

Together, these measures could cut emissions by 90%.   Most of that could happen in the first 10 years.  And these measures, rapidly effected, would in fact limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5 degrees  above pre-industrial levels.

The world has been repeatedly warned.  The warnings have been brushed off or ignored.  Instead of a gradual adjustment over decades, starting decades ago, we have phaffed and dithered and allowed ourselves to be lied to by oil and coal companies.  And now a modest  1 or 2% a year decline will not do.  We will need a 15% per annum decline to cut emissions by 90% by 2035, to prevent temperatures rising by more than 1.5 degrees.  

As the Economist says: 'There will be nowhere safe.'  And the public is beginning to realise this, and is both frightened and angry.  Expect serious steps to cut emissions.

The climate change panic button is coming

 Record floods, record droughts, record heat, record bushfires.  Sometimes in the same place a couple of weeks apart.   It's crystal clear that global heating and climate change aren't something happening in some far distant future.  They're happening now.  And it's going to get worse, because emissions prolly haven't yet peaked, despite the slump caused by the Covid crash.  So how long before there's panic?

A general view of flood-affected area following heavy rainfalls in Schuld, Germany [Reuters].
Source: Al Jazeera

From The New Daily

This week it’s floods in Germany, 170 dead and terrible devastation.

A few weeks ago people were dying from the heat in Canada, which reached about 49 degrees Celsius in Lytton, British Columbia.

Wildfires are now breaking out across North America.

This is from the global warming that has already occurred, which is about 1.2 degrees above the pre-industrial age.

The world is now trying to stop it going above 1.5 degrees by getting emissions down to net zero by 2050.

Even if we succeed in that, which is far from guaranteed, the extreme weather events will be significantly worse and more frequent than they are now.

But at what point will governments hit the real panic button?

Because net zero by 2050 is not it. [We have to halve emissions by 2030, then halve them again between 2030 and 2040, and again by 2050.  This implies that emissions have to fall by 7% per annum]

The reason many are still negotiating, prevaricating and putting it off is that governments and businesses are not looking at global warming in terms of risk, but are using scenario analysis instead.

For example, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority issued a draft prudential practice guide on climate change in April, which included 4 degrees of warming as one of its two “scenarios” for banks to use in their future planning.

A 4 degree rise in the average global temperature would make large parts of the planet uninhabitable and lead to the total collapse of the banking system. No need for any planning.

The other APRA scenario was for 2 degrees of warming or less, consistent with the Paris Agreement, which should happen if all countries meet their Paris pledges, which so far they’re not.

And even under that scenario, the banking system barely survives.

There was nothing especially wrong with APRA’s guidance note – it was just a typical example of the arse-covering required by bureaucrats and corporate executives to cover their environmental, social and governance (ESG) obligations, with a paper trail to prove they did it.

But it highlights the problem with using scenarios instead of risk analysis.

Since most countries are now committed to net-zero emissions by 2050, even though the policies to achieve that have not been implemented, everyone can assume that the scenario of 1.5 degrees is locked in – a likelihood of 100 per cent. But that’s not correct.

Even then there would still be a two-thirds risk of it being 2 degrees instead of 1.5, because of feedback loops caused by more carbon dioxide being released by the warming that has occurred.

Current policies, unchanged, would result in 2.4 degrees of warming, which would be terrible, but there would be a high risk (about 67 per cent) of 3 degrees, which would be catastrophic.

Precise risk analysis of global warming is difficult because feedback loop tipping points are unknown and unpredictable.

It’s known that with 1.5 to 2 degrees of warming, the combination of permafrost melt in Siberia, wildfires in the world’s forests and warming of the ocean will release more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which means a feedback loop could take the temperature to 2.5 degrees above pre-industrial temperatures – and perhaps beyond – no matter what we do.

I was reminded of the power of risk analysis by the recent reaction to the risk of blood clots and death from the AstraZeneca vaccine.

It appears to be something like one in 88,000, or 0.0011 per cent to get a clot.

If that happens, the chance of then dying is 4 per cent, which boils down to a 0.00044 per cent chance of dying from having the AstraZeneca vaccine.

On the strength of that risk, the UK discontinued AstraZeneca for under-40s and the Australian medical authorities have warned against it, and people are shunning it in droves and waiting for Pfizer.

The risk of catastrophe and even extinction as a result of global warming is a lot higher than 0.00044 per cent and yet most of us are still driving petrol cars and eating steaks and hamburgers, and governments are still talking about targets 30 years away (or not, in Australia’s case).

Whatever the temperature gets to – whether it be 1.5, 2, 3 or 4 degrees of warming – it would be a global average, uneven across the planet.

Anything much more than 1.5 degrees and heatwaves in some parts of the world would make them too hot to survive for some of the year, so humans couldn’t live there at all.

Daily life everywhere else would be an unbearable succession of extreme weather events, as we are seeing in Germany at the moment.

Sea level would rise by 1.5 to 2 metres, making many coastal and low-lying areas uninhabitable.

As a result, millions, possibly billions, of people would be displaced making a mess of global borders.

Banking and insurance would become impossible. The financial system would collapse.

What’s the risk of that? 10 per cent? 1 per cent?

Even if it was 1 per cent, that would be like two or three planes a day crashing after take-off in Australia – which would lead to zero take-offs until it was fixed.

At some point well before 2050, governments will be forced to switch to risk analysis for climate change, and to publish the result.

Unless scientists say the risk is zero – which they won’t – then whatever they come up with, political leaders will be forced to hit the panic button by alarmed voters.

What does the panic button look like?

I’m not sure, but here are some thoughts: Fossil fuels would be suddenly and totally banned, or made prohibitively expensive, and oil, gas and coal would instantly go bust; physical tourism would be banned and air travel confined to essentials and rich elites so the airline industry would collapse; the lithium battery and hydrogen would suddenly boom.

And so on.

Life would change more completely than it has during the pandemic.

In short, it would look like war

Peak emissions closer than you think

Michael Liebreich is the doyen of energy change analysts.  He founded New Energy Finance which was bought by Bloomberg to become BNEF.  

I've taken extracts from this piece published on BNEF's blog.  (The emphases are mine)  If you don't want to read the whole piece, see my summary at the end.

I believe the new decade will see us hit peak energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and start to see a modest but meaningful decline. Just to be clear, we will not see the sort of decline demanded by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – a 20% cut by 2030 to keep temperature rises to 2C, a 45% cut to remain under 1.5C – but I would guess at a drop of around 5%.

Clearly that is not enough to put us fully on track to avoid appalling climate change impacts, and by 2030 we will have to admit 1.5C is out of reach. But it will be a game-changer: it will demonstrate to even the most pessimistic that we can bend the arc; it will end the feeling of helplessness and impending doom that has taken over our public discourse; and it will set us up for much more decisive reductions in the subsequent decades.

Optimism, therefore, but not without limits. It’s hard to be an unbridled optimist. Over the past decade, global emissions have risen by 15%. For one brief three-year period, between 2013 and 2016, they were flat – for the first time ever outside major recessions – but in 2017 they took off again, as the global economy boomed and China reverted to pumping cheap money into high-carbon infrastructure and building. Since then, emissions have been growing by around 1.2% per year.

[But,] while emissions grew 15% over the past decade, the global economy grew by 45%. On average, economic growth outstripped emissions growth by 2.4 percentage points per year.  [I.e, energy intensity fell by 2.4% p.a.] If that gap can be made to increase by just 1.4 percentage points, emissions peak, even in a growing economy. Increase it beyond that and we are over the hump: emissions will start to fall. Impossible pipe dream? Or something we will see in the course of the next decade?

First of all, the maths.  In 2017, a report by the World Resources Institute (WRI) showed that there were 49 countries, representing 36% of global emissions, which have already passed peak emissions [even though they have growing economies]. Almost the whole of the OECD is reducing its carbon footprint, even when you adjust for imports (something the ‘degrowth’ brigade pretend is impossible). The WRI expects a further eight countries, representing another 23% of emissions, to peak within the next decade.

Last week, in Paris, I attended the first meeting of the International Energy Agency’s Global Commission for Urgent Action on Energy Efficiency, of which I am a member. The Commission’s goal is to raise the rate of improvement in global energy intensity from its current 1.5% to 3% per year.

I have three main takeaways from the meeting: 1) energy efficiency is finally gaining recognition as a national priority in many countries, whether for climate or energy security reasons; 2) there is as much ‘low-hanging fruit’ today as there ever was; 3) there is a far better understanding of how to deliver improvements than a decade ago.

As we close out the decade, BNEF has concluded that around two-thirds of the world’s population now live in countries in which wind or solar are the lowest-cost ways of generating power. The world records for low-cost wind and solar are both now down to around $17/MWh. That is around a third of the cost of new gas-powered generation – even in the U.S., where there is a glut of cheap gas.  [Averages are of course higher, for both renewables and coal]

By 2030, I have no doubt whatsoever that the world record for low-cost onshore wind and solar will be below $10/MWh. It will probably be set in China, Morocco, Mexico or the Gulf states, who have been vying for leadership for the past decade. However, there is a chance it could be in India, Brazil, the U.S. or even Australia.

As we approach the final days of 2019, wind and solar are generating around 8.5% of global electricity. BNEF estimates that figure will be nearer 25% by 2030.

The biggest unanswered question, as renewable penetration grows, is whether the cost of managing intermittency will drop – with cheaper storage, growing demand-response capacity, business model innovation and smart policy design – as claimed by fans of renewables – or soar, as claimed by their opponents.
It’s a vital question, which will decide whether wind and solar can maintain their historical growth rates, or whether their penetration must soon saturate. All the main energy models are designed around the idea of renewable energy saturation: growth rates decelerating into the future – whether abruptly or slowly, but always markedly decelerating. The IEA’s central scenario, Stated Policies or SPS, has the combination of wind and solar reaching only 24% by 2040. BNEF’s NEO model, always more bullish, shows them at 39% in 2040 and 48% by 2050.

What if these models are wrong? What if learning, innovation and the co-evolution of demand-side industries continue to win the race against the physics of intermittency, and allow historical growth rates to continue for a few more decades?

Two decades ago everyone assumed that the cost of managing intermittency would soar after the first 5% of wind and solar entered the power mix; a decade ago we thought the inflection was 20%; now we know it is not this side of 40%. Modelling exercises around the world suggest that it is not until you reach 80% or more in any decently-connected grid that the cost of managing intermittency really starts to go vertical.  [But of course, by the time we get to 80% renewables, (a) storage costs will be much lower, and (b) overcapacity will be much cheaper]

To believe in a renewable energy singularity, the first thing to do is to extract all the latent flexibility in our current power systems, and then build more, in the form of power storage, demand response, long-distance interconnections and linkages with transport and heat. We’ll see a lot of that in the coming decade.

The second thing we need to do is learn to love overcapacity. As I said in a keynote in 2014, in a high-renewables system, overcapacity is not a bug, it’s a feature.

The average capacity factor of the world’s hydro plants is 42%; gas peaking plants 15%. Even so-called baseload coal plants run on average only 54% of the time. If technology is cheap, and demand or supply are intermittent, we overbuild. Wind and solar are no different.

Will we build many weeks’ worth of power storage, or hydrogen electrolysis, just to capture peak renewable electricity that would otherwise go to waste? In a word, no, because curtailment will be cheaper. Think about it: if your $20/MWh wind or solar suffers 33% curtailment, you know what happens? It turns into $30/MWh wind or solar – still half the price of power from any other source.

The third thing you would need to see if you want wind and solar to sustain their current growth rates is significant electrification of transport, (which I don’t think anyone doubts is on the cards – Daimler Benz clearly things so, for the first time in 135 years it is not working on the next generation of internal combustion engine) and heating (which, with global heat pump sales growing at 12% per year for the last decade, might finally be kicking off).

The fourth thing would be the electrification of industry and the generation of green fuels, be they hydrogen, ammonia or liquid fuels like methanol. It is hard to believe it was just 18 months ago that I wrote about this in Beyond Three Thirds: The Road to Deep Decarbonization, because there has been so much progress since.

BNEF’s seminal work on the cost of electrolysis suggests that green hydrogen (based on renewable power) will start to be competitive with brown hydrogen (from steam methane reforming of natural gas with no carbon capture) by 2030, and that by 2050 it will have a clear advantage. That means that, even in the absence of a carbon price, green hydrogen has the chance to eliminate the 5% of global emissions that currently result from fertilizer production and oil refining. A $20 carbon price would see it eat into the 2.2% of emissions from the global shipping industry. A $50 carbon price pushes green hydrogen into the 13% of industrial emissions from steel and concrete; and a $100 carbon price would take it into space heating, glass and other sectors. So the combination of cheap green hydrogen and a $100 carbon price will create an addressable market by 2050 of nearly 30% of global emissions. Neat.

Let’s talk about the fifth driver of a potential renewable singularity: batteries. By 2030, EV batteries will cost around $65/kWh at the pack level. [Assuming a compound 15% p.a. decline, $65/kWh will be reached in 2024] That’s $6,500 for the battery in a full-sized vehicle with a range of 300 miles; $13,000 gets you a 600-mile range – certainly bigger range than my bladder can handle. [And the batteries in small 'city cars' with 40 kWh will cost just $2600] 

All the pinch-points in the mineral supply chain will have been long ironed out, and by 2030, all end-of-life batteries will be recycled – if there are any.

Yes, you read that right. Solid-state batteries may or may not have hit the market, delivering four-times the energy density, and launching swarms of electric planes. But there will certainly have been continued progress in lithium-ion technology towards the “million-mile EV battery”, which can deliver 10,000 charge cycles. It will make possible either cars with 50-year lives, ubiquitous vehicle-to-grid business models, or second-use applications at scale – or all three. Mindblowing.

Oh, and by 2030, you will not even remember about range anxiety – the same way you don’t remember that there were once insufficient modems to connect to the internet, or insufficient bandwidth for online video. 

Those who doubt the value of renewable energy in addressing climate change always point to negligible impact so far. Even at 8.5% penetration into power demand – and after investment of $2.7 trillion – wind and solar have only reduced global emissions by only around 2.5% from where they would otherwise have been. They have so far failed to absorb growth in energy demand.

That is to miss the point. As leading energy economist Professor Michael Grubb has pointed out in Conditional Optimism: Perspectives on Deep Decarbonisation, the key clean technologies are growing according to the dynamics of logistic curves, penetrating into incumbent technologies. Professor Grubb uses lots of fancy economics to forecast what might happen next. I’ll paraphrase: in a logistic curve penetration, the first 1% takes forever; from 1% to 5% is like waiting for a sneeze –it is going to be explosive, you just don’t know when it will happen; 5% to 50% happens much faster than you think – that is when the restructurings and bankruptcies happen.

No single “sneeze” will wipe out fossil fuel use across energy and transport; It will occur sector by sector, country by country. Over the past six years, LED light-bulbs have gone from less than 5% global market share to over 40%; coal power in the U.K. from 40% to a couple of percent; plug-in vehicles in Norway from less than 5% to over 50%. In each case, there was a slow start, an agonizing wait, and then the sneeze. Bless you!

What does all this mean for coal consumption? According to Global Energy Monitor (formerly Coalswarm), in the final 2.5 years of this decade, global coal capacity grew by an average of 56GW or 2.8% per year – which hardly looks like a harbinger of peak emissions.

India and China alone have between them a pipeline of 280GW of new plants, bigger than the entire current U.S. fleet and equivalent to 15% of current global capacity. However, this does not begin to tell the full story.

First, what really matters is not capacity, but how much coal is actually burned. Over the past decade, capacity factors for thermal generation have been falling around the world, in China’s case to record lows. Globally – not that you would know it from the mainstream news – coal consumption in the power sector has been flat since 2012; preliminary figures for 2019 show a drop of around 3%.

Just this month it was announced that over half of the power plants operated by China’s Big Five state-owned utilities are running at a loss. The government has plans for up to one third of them to shut by 2021, removing 15% of the country’s coal capacity. As for India, despite its 85GW pipeline, on average it has commissioned less than 10GW per year for the past three years. This September, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a push for 450GW of zero-carbon generation by 2030.

In the EU, eight out of 28 countries have already committed to phasing out coal by 2030; it will be entirely gone in the U.K. by 2025.  Germany, having prioritized the closure of nuclear over coal to date, will be off coal by 2038. The EU’s Green Deal, announced last week by new President Ursula von der Leyen, included 35 billion euros of support for Poland and other countries to get off coal.

In the U.S., despite promises to end the so-called “war on coal”, more coal capacity has been shuttered under President Trump’s first term than during any three years of the Obama administration.  Every publicly-quoted coal company has gone through Chapter 11 since 2016, as has privately-owned Murray Energy, whose CEO, Robert Murray, wrote the blueprint for the president’s energy policy. Not one new coal plant has been built since 2015. None are being built today, and it looks like none ever will be again.

Of course, coal is used outside the electricity sector, notably in heating and industry. That source of demand looks likely to carry on increasing for a few years at least.

Before 2000, the orthodox view of oil demand (and energy analysts always default to orthodoxy) was that by 2030 it would grow to around 130 million barrels. By 2000, oil demand was still expected to grow forever, but it would reach only 120 million barrels by 2030. By 2010, the accepted wisdom was still endless growth, but only 105 million barrels of demand by 2030. See the pattern? Oil demand growth consistently undershooting the growth predicted by experts.

At no point did it cross the experts’ minds that maybe the same trends that they kept missing would see oil demand peak, and then start to fall. When I first suggested it in 2015, it felt like a transgressive act.

Today, there is not an oil company in the world that is not talking about peak demand. Even Saudi Aramco’s recent IPO prospectus predicted “a levelling-off around 2035”. BNEF expects demand from light and heavy vehicles to peak in 2030; this is one of the rare times I depart (slightly) from its view. I see peak road transport demand around 2025; add in the growing areas of air transport, shipping and petrochemicals, and I think we’ll see peak oil this side of 2030.

So far, you will notice I have barely mentioned policy. The picture I have painted is a bit like the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario: these trends, which should see emissions from fossil fuels peak by 2030, are what I see happening even in the absence of significant further policy in favor of climate action.

But, of course, there will be further climate policy – and lots of it.

In the U.K., the new Johnson government is committed to achieving net zero by 2050. At this September’s Climate Action Summit in New York, 77 other countries, 10 regions and over 100 cities announced their intention to follow the U.K.’s lead. As I write this, the EU has just unveiled its Green Deal, which is going to enshrine a 2050 net zero target in law, as well as a plan to reduce greenhouse gases by “at least 50% and towards 55% by 2030, in a responsible way”.

In Canada, Justin Trudeau hung on to government, albeit not his parliamentary majority, in this year’s General Election. The country is therefore the first to implement the sort of tax-and-dividend scheme that could be a model for carbon pricing in political economies where new taxes are all but impossible to impose.

In the U.S., climate is a key battleground for the Democratic Party Primary, but what is more interesting is that Republicans with an eye on political life after President Trump are finally conceding they too need a climate policy.

Even the international climate negotiations should be expected to deliver some level of positive mood music over the coming decade, despite the potential withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement and the failure of the latest COP conference in Madrid, as I describe in the sister-piece to this article, Climate Wars Episode IV – a New Hope for the 2020s?.

So there you have it – the reasons why I believe we will see peak fossil fuel emissions during the coming decade. 

The small inset chart shows atmospheric concentrations of CO2, the larger chart annual increases in CO2 concentrations.

RCP means representative concentration pathway.  RCP2.6 would be consistent with a 1 degree C rise in temps, RCP4.5 1.8 degrees C.  Liebreich's analysis suggests something between RCP2.6 and RCP4.5.  If emissions only peak in the late 2020s, policy shifts as panic about climate change increases could lead to a much steeper decline thereafter.

To sum up:

• Renewables are going to get insanely cheap.
• Thermal coal demand will peak before 2030
• Peak oil is within sight
• The green hydrogen/methane economy will be cost competitive by 2030, and at $100/tonne carbon price, will replace 30% of emissions
• energy saving still has plenty of low hanging fruit.
• renewables overcapacity will be a design feature in electricity generation.
• CO2 emissions will peak before 2030, and by 2030, will be 5% lower than they are now

I've made a lot of these points before.  Liebreich makes them better, and with greater authority.